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2
Negotiation under the threat of an auction 
 
 
“The greatest obstacle in an auction is that strategic buyers with reasons to offer higher prices may 
refuse to participate. … The mere threat of an auction, however, is often enough to galvanize a 
strategic buyer into making a good preemptive offer.” 
Brian O’Hare (partner at Coram Clairfield) 
Source: Clairfield Review, Third Quarter 2006 
1. Introduction 
Among the many results reported in the merger and acquisition (M&A) literature, the 
apparent low level of competition among bidders is particularly puzzling.  Betton et al. 
(2008) report that, out of 35,727 bids for public and private U.S. targets during the period 
1980-2005, 33,836 (94.7%) are single bid contest, most often classified as friendly 
transactions. The authors also stress that the diffusion of poison pills and other anti-takeovers 
defenses at the beginning of the 1990s has virtually eliminated hostile takeovers, which 
represent the most striking form of competition among management teams to obtain or keep 
control of assets. Boone and Mulherin (2007; 2008a), analyzing a sample of 308 takeovers in 
the 1990s for which they collect information from the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) show that half of their sample deals are one-on-one negotiations without 
explicit competition and that bid premiums are not significantly different between single-
bidder negotiations and auctions with multiple bidders.  If competition exists in the M&A 
market, its lack of impact on bid premium is puzzling. 
Is the market for corporate control non-competitive?  This question is important. 
Competition among rival bidders to acquire targets promotes efficient allocation of 
management teams among corporations. Efficient allocation of management teams is 
probably one of the best ways to protect shareholders and create wealth.  Competition is a 
key ingredient if the market for corporate control is to exert effective external control over 
incumbent managers. According to Manne (1965, p. 113), “greater capital losses are 
prevented by the existence of a competitive market for corporate control.” 
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An absence of competition in the market for corporate control would also raise intriguing 
questions.  Why do the shareholders of target firms not systematically require competitive 
sale procedures? It is well known that competition increases the expected revenue of the 
seller.  Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show, for example, that, in an English auction, the seller 
is always better off having one more bidder than engaging in a follow-on bargaining 
procedure with the winning bidder.  If friendly transactions are genuinely free of competition, 
the high percentage of friendly negotiations in the M&A market is definitely puzzling.  Why 
do bidders have such low (or negative) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) while target 
shareholders profit from large, positive and significant wealth effects (see, e.g., Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Moeller et al., 2004; Betton et al., 2008)? In the absence of competition, this 
contradicts intuition (and insights provided by auction theory): non-competitive bidders 
should be able to keep a significant fraction of the wealth creation generated by mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Is the market for corporate control really lacking competition? Or is the M&A market 
more competitive than it appears?  These are the question that we address in this paper. 
To anticipate, we argue that ex ante competition is the underlying explanation for 
acquirers’ bidding behavior.  It is the pressure of potential rivals that matters.  Though 
hidden, competitive pressure exists also in supposedly friendly negotiations (even when, ex 
post, the reported number of bidders is one).  Our argument is analogous to the theory of 
contestable markets (Baumol, 1982).  Even when there is only one buyer, that buyer may be 
forced to act as if there were more.  A perfectly contestable market is characterized by 
absolutely costless entry and exit.  In such a market, competitive pressures exerted by the 
perpetual threat of entry, as well as by the presence of actual rivals, induce competitive 
behavior. Free entry is a key condition for a market to be perfectly contestable.  Similarly, we 
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argue that the cost of organizing the auction is an important factor explaining the pressure of 
ex ante competition.   
Adopting a similar depiction of the takeover contest as Betton et al. (forthcoming), we 
first provide a theoretical analysis of the role of ex ante competition in the M&A market.  The 
model focuses on friendly deals (negotiations between the parties), which are dominant in 
number. The acquirer’s decision process in friendly deals is represented as a two-stage 
extensive game with a finite horizon. The first stage is the bargaining stage: the acquirer 
proposes a bid for the target shares.  If the target shareholders accept the proposed bid, the 
game ends. If the target shareholders rebuff the bid, they organize an auction to sell their 
shares.  This second stage can be either a private-auction process such as those highlighted by 
Hansen (2001) and Boone and Mulherin (2007) or, mainly for listed targets, the appearance 
of other potential acquirers.  The second stage is modeled as a classic second-price auction.   
The target shareholders’ decision to accept or rebuff the initial acquirer’s bid in the first 
stage depends on the bid level but also on auction costs in the second stage. These costs 
include direct costs such as financial intermediaries’ fees and commissions, communication 
and advertising expenses, and indirect costs such as the time delay needed to complete the 
auction or the uncertainty over the number of bidders and their valuations.  While direct costs 
can be estimated by the acquirer (e.g., by asking an investment banker to provide some 
estimates), the indirect costs are a function of the target shareholders’ urgency to sell and are 
thus private knowledge. The acquirer’s trade-off during the bargaining phase is therefore 
clear: choosing a high bid increases the probability of concluding the deal without being 
subject to competitive pressure in the second stage, but it is costly.  We solve the game by 
backward induction to identify the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
This model allows us to explore the impact of competition (the number of bidders in the 
second stage) on the equilibrium bidding strategy of the first stage acquirer.  We find that a 
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higher number of rival bidders anticipated in the second stage induces higher bids from the 
first stage acquirer (during the bargaining phase) and results in lower bidder profits.  This 
provides our main testable hypothesis: the acquirer’s bid during the bargaining phase should 
be an increasing function of ex ante competition (the anticipated number of bidders in the 
auction stage if the negotiations fail in the first stage).  Our second testable implication is that 
higher expected costs of organizing the auction result in lower bid premium during the 
bargaining phase. 
Strategic actions by acquirers renders the ex-post observed number of bidders a poor 
proxy for the ex ante competition and suggests the importance of developing better proxies 
for ex ante competition. In this regard, our argument is close to Fishman’s (1988; 1989) in the 
context of jump bidding.   
The empirical analysis of ex ante competition on acquirers’ bidding behavior in friendly 
negotiations requires a precise understanding of the procedures used by the involved parties.  
Following Boone and Mulherin (2007), we develop this key information using the merger 
background section of the U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) 14A and S-4 
filings for mergers and 14D filings for tender offers.  The availability of SEC filings limits 
the sample period to 1994-2006 but allows us to collect several other interesting variables 
(such as the identity of the initiator and the number of contacted potential bidders in a formal 
or an informal auction1).  The availability of control variables limits the sample size to 
approximately 600 transactions, each one “significant” as defined in Masulis et al. (2007).  
Since our theoretical predictions pertain to the acquirer’s bidding behavior, our dependent 
variable is the bid premium.   
                                                 
1
 As in Boone and Mulherin (2007) the auction can be either formal or informal. A formal auction is organized 
by financial intermediaries at the request of the target and the bidding evolves in structured way. An informal 
auction is a process wherein the target or its financial advisors contact potential acquirers in a less structured 
way. 
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We introduce several proxies for ex ante competition.  Using an algorithm suggested in 
Harford (2005), we identify M&A waves at the industry level.  This provides our first proxy 
for ex ante competition: an M&A wave dummy variable, which takes the value one when the 
transaction is announced during an M&A wave.  The rationale is that competition for targets 
is stronger during M&A waves.  To test whether the results are affected by a forward looking 
bias, we also use the probability of being in an M&A wave estimated with a logit model 
based on the M&A wave predictors suggested in Harford (2005).  Our second proxy for ex 
ante competition is the lagged deal frequency (the number of deals in the industry divided by 
the number of firms in the industry during either the last three months or the last six months).  
The rationale is again that more competition leads to more deals.  We lag the deal frequency 
to circumvent potential endogeneity among the competition to acquire targets in an industry, 
the attractiveness of targets in the industry and the bidding behavior of acquirers.  Our third 
proxy of ex ante competition is a measure of the private buyout funds activities.  The 
investments of buyout funds grown dramatically during the last decade (see Boone and 
Mulherin, 2008b) and the presence of such funds could represent tough competition for 
targets.  Our last proxy is a dummy variable for recessions identified by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER).  During recessions, competition among bidders might be 
smaller.    
In our model, the eagerness for the target shareholders’ to sell is an important determinant 
of auction costs. To proxy for this eagerness, we use the target’s debt ratio.  The rationale is 
that a high level of debt represents pressure on the target to negotiate quickly.  In our sample, 
the debt ratio is positively correlated with the target’s market to book ratio and the target’s 
return on assets and, therefore, is not an indication of poor target quality.  Moreover, we 
control in the multivariate analysis for the quality of target using the target Tobin’s q ratio.  
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From the econometric viewpoint, two potential pitfalls within our multivariate analyses 
are the inclusion of generated regressors and self-selection.  We control the first issue by 
using the Murphy and Topel Theorem [see Greene (2008, p. 509)] to adjust standard errors.  
To offset self-selection, we use the classic Heckman approach (Heckman, 1979) to model the 
choice of selling procedure (negotiation versus auction).   
The results generally confirm the impact of ex ante competition on the bidding behavior 
of acquirers, in particular for negotiated transactions; more potential competitors are 
associated with higher bids.  The only exception is for the wave dummy proxy of ex ante 
competition; which fails to deliver statistically significant results.   
We also find that: (i) targets with more debt obtain lower premiums in negotiations. This 
result confirms that auction costs affect bid premiums in negotiations; (ii) the effect of ex 
ante competition on the bidding behavior of acquirers is weaker when estimated with a mixed 
sample of negotiated and auctioned (formal or informal) transactions;  (iii) the deal initiator 
role (acquirer or target) is a primary determinant of the selling procedure.  Target-initiated 
deals are most often auctions while bidder-initiated deals are most often negotiations.  This is 
consistent with the idea that targets try to stimulate competition while acquirers seek to avoid 
it.   
We provide also various robustness checks. Among them, we test whether our proxies of 
ex ante competition are positively correlated with deal synergies. They are not.  This rules out 
an alternative explanation (that they are actually proxying for the merger’s wealth creation).  
These results, taken together, help to solve the puzzling questions raised by the apparent 
(almost) absence of ex-post observable competition in the M&A market. Competition need 
not be observed ex-post to play a crucial role.  The mere threat of rival offers is powerful 
enough to increase bids.  This helps explain why targets do not systematically resort to 
auctions when they are solicited by single bidders. Auctions are costly and time-consuming. 
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In a sample mixing auctions and negotiations, the ex-post observed number of bidders turns 
out to be a poor proxy for competition  Even when the there is only a single bidder (the 
definition of a negotiation) the bid premium can be in high when there is a competitive 
environment during the negotiations. This contributes to explaining why previous studies did 
not uncover a significant relation among ex-post measures of competition, bid premiums and 
acquirer CARs. 
Our results complement results in previous studies (see, e.g., Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; 
Masulis et al., 2007) that the M&A market is an effective external corporate governance 
mechanism (competition being a necessary condition for this mechanism to play its role).  
Our results are also consistent with the idea that the bid premium can be used by acquirers to 
deter competition; this constitutes indirect empirical support for jump bidding models such as 
Fishman (1988; 1989).  The third stream of literature related to our work involves bargaining 
and auction models in corporate finance.  By analyzing the interconnection between a 
bargaining phase and an auction phase within an extensive game, like Betton et al.  
(forthcoming), our model illustrates the spectrum of potential applications of such theory in 
corporate finance. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 first summarizes the known facts about the 
relation between competition, acquirer bidding behavior and M&A wealth effects for the 
involved parties.  It goes on to formalize the relation between ex ante competition and 
acquirer bidding behavior in the framework of negotiated deals.  Section 3 is devoted to the 
related empirical analysis.  Section 4 provides some complementary robustness checks.  
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Competition and the market for corporate control 
2.1. Stylized facts 
Andrade et al. (2001), studying a U.S. sample of deals between listed companies in the 
period 1973−1998, show that the average number of bidders per deal is around 1.1.  In 
Moeller et al. (2007) only 4.19% of the 4,322 deals announced by U.S. firms in the period 
1980−2002 involved competition by rival bidders.  Betton et al. (2008), focusing on 35,727 
bids during the period 1980-2005, find that 94.7% are single bids and 1.8% are multiple bids 
by a single bidder.  Only 3.4% are multiple bids with rival bidders.  Overall, these numbers 
depict a very low level of ex-post observable competition.   
Observable competition was somewhat higher for tender offers in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when hostile bids were more frequent.  Indeed, hostility itself indicates competition between 
management teams seeking to control of the same target assets [in the spirit of the Manne 
(1965) concept of the market for corporate control.]  Betton and Eckbo (2000) study takeover 
contests in tender offers by U.S. firms over the period 1971−1990.  In a sample of 1,353 
initial bids, 508 cases involved multiple-bid contests, and out of these, 214 cases were 
challenged by rival bidders immediately after the first bid.  In other words, 845 (62.4%) 
initial bids were not challenged by rival companies.  So even during this specific period, ex-
post competition is observable in only a minority of cases.  Moreover, since the beginning of 
the nineties, with the diffusion of poison pills and other powerful anti-takeover mechanisms, 
hostile transactions have become rare (Betton et al., 2008).   
Private takeovers provide other interesting evidence.  Boone and Mulherin (2008a) argue 
that the number of bidders is a noisy and incomplete measure of takeover competition.  Using 
merger documents from the U.S. SEC, the authors build sophisticated proxies for competition 
based on how many potential bidders were contacted in private sales process and how many 
actually submitted bids.  These authors analyze 308 takeovers in the 1990s.  They report that 
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for 145 transactions (47% of the sample), the sale procedure was a private auction among 
multiple bidders.  For the remaining cases, there was a direct negotiation with only one 
bidder.   
For private auctions, on average, 13.81 potential buyers were contacted, 5.77 completed a 
confidentiality agreement, 1.51 submitted a private written offer and 1.23 publicly announced 
a formal bid.2   From private takeovers, then, two main conclusions appear to be (1) auctions 
take place in fewer than half of the transactions and (2) only a small number of potential 
buyers actually submit a bid.  Such data reinforce the impression that competition is, at best, 
quite low in the M&A market. Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008a) also provide results on the 
relations among competition, bid premiums, acquirer and target CARs and transaction 
procedures.  Their main conclusions are that (i) target CARs and bid premiums are not 
significantly different between negotiations and auctions, (ii) competition (based on 
information about the private takeover process) do not affect acquirers’ CARs and (iii) target 
intangibles, the mode of payment and the presence of investment banks are significant 
determinants transactions procedures.   
To conclude this literature review, it is worthwhile returning to one of the most well-
known stylized facts about the M&A market: acquirers experience low (if not negative) 
CARs when announcing deals while target shareholders capture most of the wealth creation 
(and wealth transfer, if any) (see, e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Moeller et al., 2004).  If 
competition is low, this fact contradicts auction theory (see Dasgupta and Hansen, 2007).  For 
example, in second price auction with N risk neutral symmetric bidders and private values, it 
is well known that a weakly dominant strategy is to bid the assessed value.  Assuming that 
                                                 
2
 In considering these figures, it is worthwhile to keep in mind Hansen’s (2001) observation that the number of 
bidders is often voluntarily limited in private takeovers. The author provides a rationale; viz., if proprietary 
information about the target were diffused too widely, the target’s value could be diminished. Evidently, there is 
a trade-off between a large number of competitive bidders to stimulate competition and the diffusion of sensitive 
information. 
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valuations follow a uniform distribution bounded between 0 and 1, the seller’s expected 
revenue is )()( 11 +− NN  (see Appendix A). This means that with two bidders, the seller’s 
expected revenue is 1/3. This represents 1/2 of the expected winning bidder’s valuation.  
With five bidders (far more than is usually observed in M&As), the seller’s expected revenue 
is 2/3. This amounts to 4/5 of the expected winning-bidder valuation.  Hence, the proportion 
of value kept by the winning bidder (the ex-post observed acquirer) should not be close to 
zero unless the number of bidders is unusually large.  From an auction theory perspective, 
only a highly competitive market for corporate control would explain the low CARs of 
acquirers.3  
2.2. Negotiation and ex ante competition 
In this section, we explore the relation between ex ante competition and acquirer bidding 
behavior when there are only bilateral negotiations (and only a single observed bidder).  The 
focus is on negotiations for two reasons: (i) they represent half of all cases and (ii) only ex 
ante competition is possible (there is no ex-post competition).  The framework is similar to 
Betton et al. (forthcoming). A related two-stage representation of the takeover contest can 
also be found in Burkart et al. (2000). 
2.2.1. Model setup 
The model is designed to reflect the essential features of a typical situation: a public firm 
is contacted by a potential acquirer, and negotiations begin.  At the conclusion of 
negotiations, the initial prospective acquirer makes an acquisition offer 1b .  If the target 
refuses this initial offer, rival bidders appear (the failed negotiation alerts them to the 
investment opportunity).  A takeover battle ensues, with multiple bidders.  The initial suitor 
makes another offer 2b  during this second stage.  The game ends with the sale of the target. 
                                                 
3
 The free-rider argument of Grossman and Hart (1980) provides an alternative explanation of why most wealth 
from M&A deals accrues to target shareholders.  However, it assumes strictly atomistic shareholding. 
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Ex-post, when the first-stage negotiations are successful, the deal is characterized as 
“friendly” in the financial press.  
Such a model is general enough to describe other situations.  For example, the sale of a 
firm may be at the request of its shareholders (e.g., family shareholders), who contact a 
financial intermediary. A potential acquiring firm is found, and negotiations ensue. Because 
the shareholders really want to sell, the financial intermediary has a mandate to organize a 
private auction among multiple potential bidders if the initial negotiations break down. This 
corresponds to some of the situations described by Boone and Mulherin (2007). The essential 
nature of these situations is that there is a two-stage takeover process: private negotiations 
first and then, if the negotiations fail, a competitive procedure. 
We model this situation using an extensive game with perfect information: each player 
knows the decisions taken previously by the other players.  In the first stage, however, 
information is asymmetric.  A second stage auction implies additional direct costs (such as 
financial intermediary fees and commissions, communication and advertising expenses, etc.) 
and indirect costs (such as the time delay needed to complete the auction or uncertainty about 
the number of bidders and their valuations).  The magnitude of indirect costs perceived by 
target shareholders depends on their eagerness to sell, which is known only by them.  
Therefore, while the direct costs are common knowledge, the indirect costs are private 
knowledge of the target shareholders.  We denote auction costs c .4 These costs play, in our 
model, the same role as the costs of participating in a sale process in Bulow and Klemperer 
(2007), where the authors analyze the conditions under which auctions are the most efficient 
                                                 
4
 Auction costs are, in our model, the key factor driving the bargaining power of the parties during the 
negotiation. Ahern (2009) provides an empirical exploration of the relation between the bargaining power of the 
merging parties and the division of merger gains. The author uses industry dependence measures to proxy for 
bargaining power.    
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selling mechanism. Note also that we assume [as does Samuelson (1984)] that the target 
shareholders have no way of credibly communicating the cost of organizing an auction. 
In the first stage (the initial negotiation), the acquirer is assumed to make a single offer.  
Not only does this assumption simplify the analysis (we do not have to model the intricacies 
of the negotiation procedure) but moreover, Samuelson (1984) has shown that it corresponds 
to the optimal behavior for a buyer bargaining with asymmetric information.  We model the 
second stage as a second-price auction.  In our setup, by the revenue equivalence theorem 
(see Milgrom, 2004), equilibrium strategies and expected payoffs are equivalent to those 
obtained in an English auction and in a first-price auction.   
When there is a takeover battle, we assume that the rejected first stage bid is a lower 
bound on the minimum price at which the target shareholders agree to sell their shares (the 
seller’s reserve price).5 This makes sense as, by refusing the bid of the initial acquirer, the 
target shareholders reveal some private information to outside investors.  Public investors 
update their valuations and a new market price emerges for the target firm.  This market price 
becomes the natural lower bound for acquirers wishing to enter the takeover battle in the 
second stage.  
The tradeoffs in the first stage are clear.  By increasing the first-stage bid, the acquirer 
increases the probability that the target will accept the offer but also obviously increase the 
acquisition cost.  Target shareholders compare the immediate and certain bid against an 
expected sale price after a takeover battle less the associated cost. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Note that this reserve price is not generally the optimal reserve price for the seller (see Riley and Samuelson, 
1981; Myerson, 1981).  Assuming that target shareholders choose the optimal reserve price raises the issue of 
ex-post commitment [see Dasgupta and Hansen (2007), Section 4.2.2, for a discussion of this point.] 
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2.2.2. Additional assumptions and notations 
We assume risk neutrality. 1v  denotes the target valuation by the initial acquirer and iv , 
the valuation of a given acquirer i . Synergies are private to the acquirer. We assume iv  to be 
strictly increasing in synergies. Rivals during the second-stage takeover battle are referred to 
as Ni ....2= 6. The distribution of iv  is (.)F  and is common knowledge. )(iv  denotes the 
order statistic of iv  for the 1−N  rivals. So, )1(v  is the maximum of ),....( 2 Nvv .  
We assume that the initial acquirer (whose valuation is v1) is a high-value bidder: at most 
one rival firm has a higher valuation.  This means, in our notation, that v1 ≥ v(2).  This 
assumption simplifies the analysis, in particular at Stage 2, and relaxing it does not change 
our results qualitatively.  Moreover, this initial high-value bidder assumption captures one of 
the empirical features of takeover battles: the first mover frequently wins the competition.  
For example, Betton and Eckbo (2000) report, for a sample of 1,353 tender offers for the 
period 1971−1990, that the initial bidder won the contest in 864 (over 63%) of the cases, and 
a rival bidder in only 198 (less than 15%) of the cases.  Comparable evidence is reported in 
Betton et al. (2008). 
We denote by Πjk the profit of player j at stage k; j is є {acquirer, target}, and k is є {1,2}.  
pj is the price at stage j.  c has the atomless distribution K(.) in the eyes of the acquirer 
(information is asymmetric, as mentioned in Section 2.2.1), with an upper bound second-
stage takeover battle. Finally, we denote by vT the stand-alone value of the target firm in the 
eyes of its shareholders. We provide in Appendix B a formal description of the game. 
                                                 
6
 We assume that the number of rivals is exogenously determined. Hansen (2001) reports the existence of 
different devices that targets can use to stimulate (or to limit) the entry of additional bidders in firm auctions. 
One could take account of these devices by including investments made by targets to stimulate the entry of more 
bidders as part of auction organizing costs.  Thus, c would become a decision variable for the target. Such an 
extension of the model is possible, albeit complex, and it simply reinforces the pressure that targets can put on 
initial acquirers during negotiations. 
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2.2.3. Equilibrium analysis 
We adopt the sub-game perfect equilibrium concept to study the outcome of the game, 
and restrict our analysis to pure strategies. As we are dealing with a finite-horizon game, 
backward induction is used to identify the equilibrium.   
Second-stage analysis, the takeover battle. We model the takeover battle as a second-
price auction with a reserve price set to the rejected first-stage negotiation offer b1.  In our 
independent private-value setting, thanks to Vickrey’s (1961) seminal contribution, second-
price auctions with reserve prices are known to be revenue equivalent to English auctions 
with reserve prices (see Matthews, 1995; Milgrom, 2004).  As shown in Table 1, there are 
three possible outcomes at this second stage: 
- Case 1 – v(1) ≤ b1: the maximum valuation of rivals is below the target shareholders’ 
reserve price (the rejected offer in the first stage).  Target shareholders then sell their shares 
to the initial acquirer at price b1 (the reserve price plays the role of the second best bid as in 
second-price auctions with reserve prices).  The target shareholders profit is Π2Target = b1 – vT 
– c.  The initial acquirer’s profit is Π2Acquirer = v1 – b1.  We denote by φ1 the probability of the 
occurrence of Case 1. 
- Case 2 – b1 < v(1) ≤ v1: the maximum valuation of rival acquirers is above the target 
shareholders’ reserve price b1 but below the initial acquirer’s valuation v1.  So, the initial 
bidder wins the auction and pays )1(~v , the second-best offer.  Note that, at this stage, )1(~v  is a 
random variable.  The target shareholders profit is Π2Target = )1(~v  – vT – c.  The initial 
acquirer’s profit is Π2Acquirer = v1 – )1(~v .  We denote by φ2 the probability of the occurrence of 
Case 2. 
- Case 3 – v(1) > v1: the maximum valuation of rivals v(1) is higher than the initial 
acquirer’s valuation v1.  The rival wins the auction and pays v1.  The target shareholders profit 
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is Π2Target = v1 – vT – c.  The initial acquirer fails to acquire the target and so makes no profit.  
We denote by φ3 the probability of the occurrence of Case 3. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
φ1 is the probability that the maximum valuation of the N−1 rivals will be below b1.  The 
probability that a given rival valuation will be below b1 is F(b1).  Under the assumption that 
the private valuations are independent with a cumulative density function of F(.), the 
probability that the N−1 rivals’ valuations will all be below b1, is 11 )( −NbF .  We follow the 
same argument to obtain φ2 and φ3.  So, the probability of Cases 1, 2 and 3 arising are 
respectively: 
Case 1: 111 )( −= NbFϕ ;       (1) 
Case 2: 
1
1
1
12 )()( −− −= NN bFvFϕ ;       (2) 
Case 3: 113 )(1 −−= NvFϕ .         (3) 
Note that, by definition, 1321 =++ ϕϕϕ and that, as we are in a second-price auction, by 
the revelation principle, the dominant strategy of acquirers (either the initial acquirer or its 
rivals) is to bid their own valuation. 
The expected price at this Stage 2 takeover battle is the average price at each possible 
outcome, weighted by the corresponding probability: 
( ) 131)1(1)1()1(2112 ~,~~)( vvvbvvEbpE ϕϕϕ +≤>+= .      (4) 
The only unknown term in Eq. (4) is ( )1)1(1)1()1( ~,~~ vvbvvE ≤> .  Using Eq. (1) to (3), this 
conditional expectation is: 
( ) ∫ −− −
−
−
=≤>
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1)1(1)1()1( )()(
)()()1(
~
,
~~
v
b
NN
N
dv
bFvF
ffvFN
vvvbvvE .   (5) 
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Combining Eq. (1) to (5), the expected price of the takeover battle can be rewritten as: 
1
1
1
2
1
1
12 ))(1()()()1()()(
1
1
vvFdvvfvFNvbbFpE N
v
b
NN −−−
−+−+= ∫  . (6) 
Note that, 
- )()()1( 2 vfvFN N −−  is the density of the rivals’ best valuations. 
- A direct investigation of Eq. (6) shows that 12 )( bpE ≥ . 12 )( bpE −  equals 
∫
−−
−+−−
1
1
)()()1())()(1( 21111
v
b
NN dvvfvFNvbvbF . By the participation constraint, we see that 
11 bv ≥ . ))(1( 11 −− NbF , being a probability, is positive. The same holds for F(v) and f(v). Note 
finally that, by definition, b1 and v1 are also positive. Therefore, the initial acquirer’s first-
stage offer b1 is a lower bound of the expected price at Stage 2.  This is reminiscent of Bulow 
and Klemperer’s (1996) result: competitive procedures always increase the expected revenue 
of the seller, compared to direct negotiation.  In our model, the target shareholders’ tradeoff 
arises from the costs of letting the takeover battle take place. 
- 0)()( 1112 ≥=∂∂ −NbFbpE : an increase in the negotiation phase offer b1 increases the 
takeover battle’s expected payment, but the greater the competition in the second-stage 
takeover battle (the larger N), the lower is this effect.  Competition increases indeed the 
probability that at least one rival will have a valuation above b1. 
From Eq. (A.6) we obtain the expected profit of the target shareholders at Stage 2 as: 
cvpEE T −−=Π )()( 2Target2 .        (7) 
The initial acquirer’s expected profit at the end of the takeover battle is the average profit 
at each possible outcome weighted by the corresponding probabilities.  Using the outcome 
profits reported in Table 1, the probabilities of each outcome from Eq. (1) to (3) and the 
conditional expectation of the highest rival valuation given in Eq. (5), we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1)1(1)1()1(1111111111Acquirer2 ~,~~)()()()()( vvbvvEvbFvFbvbFvE NNN ≤>−−+−=Π −−−  .  (8) 
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The first part of this expression corresponds to the profit when the rival maximum 
valuation is below the initial acquirer’s bid at the negotiation phase; the second part 
corresponds to the profit if the rival maximum valuation is above the initial acquirer’s bid at 
the negotiation phase, but below the initial acquirer’s valuation.  These profits are weighted 
by the probabilities of their occurrence.  Note that ( ) 0)()( 1111Acquirer2 ≤−=∂Π∂ −NbFbvE : an 
increase in the first-stage negotiation offer reduces the initial acquirer’s second-stage 
expected profit by the exact amount of the increase in the second-stage takeover battle 
expected price (see Eq. (6)). 
First-stage analysis, the negotiation. Having derived the expressions for the expected 
profit of the target shareholders and the initial acquirer in the second-stage takeover battle, 
we can now turn to the analysis of the first-stage negotiation phase.  It is worth first noting 
that in Eq. (6) and (8), b1, the initial acquirer’s first-stage offer, appears in the term F(b1)N–1.  
Unless N = 2 and F(.) is linear (uniform distribution), there is therefore no hope of deriving a 
closed-form formula.  Stating the target shareholders’ and the initial acquirer’s decision 
problems and expected profits at this first stage negotiation is, however, enough for us to 
study the role of competition and of the cost of organizing the auction. 
The target decision problem during the negotiation phase can be expressed as: 
{ } )()1()(
Target
211,0
Π−+−
∈
ExvbxMax T
x
 ,      (9) 
where x is a binary variable taking the value 1 if accepted and 0 if refused.  Using Eq. (A.7) 
and denoting the optimal decision as x*, the target shareholders’ expected profit is: 
[ ]cvpExvbxE TT −−−+−=Π )()1()()( 2*1*Target1  .    (10) 
The target shareholders will reject the initial acquirer offer if )()( Target21 Π≤− Evb T , this is 
to say if 12 )( bpEc −≤ .  This happens with probability ( )12 )( bpEK −  in the eyes of the initial 
bidder.  As expected, the higher the expected price at Stage 2, the higher the probability that 
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the initial acquirer’s offer is rejected.  Increasing the first stage negotiation bid b1 increases 
the probability of acceptance.   
The initial acquirer’s decision problem at this negotiation phase is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ))()()()(1 1Acquirer2121112
1
vEbpEKbvbpEKMax
b
Π−+−−−    (11) 
and the expected payoff of the initial acquirer is given by  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ))()()()(1)( 1Acquirer2*12*11*121Acqiorer1 vEbpEKbvbpEKvE Π−+−−−=Π  . (12) 
It can be shown b1* exists, and the conditions under which it is unique can be established.7 
2.2.4. Bid premium, ex ante competition and auction costs 
The model developed in the preceding sub-sections allows us to study (i) the effect of 
competition in the second-stage takeover battle (here captured by N−1, the number of rivals 
in the second stage) and (ii) the effect of auction costs c  on the equilibrium bid *1b  that will 
emerge from the negotiation phase. This will allow us to derive the two propositions that we 
test in Section 3.  We start by analyzing the effects of competition on the Stage 2 takeover-
battle equilibrium outcome.  We then return to the Stage 1 negotiation phase.   
The role of competition in the takeover battle. Central to the analysis of competition the 
takeover equilibrium is the effect of the number of rivals on the expected price in the second 
stage, i.e., the effect of N−1 on )( 2pE .  Using Eq. (6), it can be shown that )( 2pE  is 
increasing in N-1.8 Since the target shareholders’ expected profit is 
cvpEE T −−=Π )()( 2Target2  (see Eq. (7)), an increase in N-1 leads to an increase in )( Target2ΠE .  
As the initial acquirer’s expected profit )( Acquirer2ΠE  is by definition the probability of 
winning the takeover battle times the acquirer’s valuation 1v  minus the expected payment, 
)( Acquirer2ΠE  is decreasing in N−1.   
                                                 
7
 Proofs are available upon request from the authors. 
8
 Proofs are available upon request from the authors. 
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The role of ex ante competition in the negotiation. It can be shown that the expected 
initial acquirer payoff in the first stage negotiation ( )Acquirer1ΠE  satisfies the strict single-
crossing difference condition.9 By the monotonic selection theorem (Milgrom (2004, p.  
102)), *1b , the optimal offer by the initial bidder during the negotiation is a non-decreasing 
function of N−1, the number of rivals.  This leads to our first proposition:10  
Proposition 1.  An increase in the number N−1 of rivals in the second-stage takeover 
battle increases the equilibrium initial acquirer offer *1b  during the negotiation phase.   
Auction costs. The sub-game perfect equilibrium is determined by auction costs, c. If 
12 )( bpEc −<  the sub-game perfect equilibrium is *1b , the optimal bid at the negotiation 
stage and refusal is the rational choice of the target shareholders. v1 is the dominant bidding 
strategy for the initial acquirer during the second stage takeover battle. If 12 )( bpEc −> , the 
sub-game perfect equilibrium is defined by *1b , acceptance by the target, and v1 (even if the 
takeover battle does not take place). If 12 )( bpEc −=  there are two sub-game perfect 
equilibria, both of which are potential solutions of the game. 
The expected profit of the initial acquirer at the first stage negotiation, given in Eq. (12), 
is a weighted sum of the profits given negotiation success and failure, the latter followed by 
an auction. The weights are the probabilities of initial offer acceptance and refusal, 
respectively ( )( )*12 )(1 bpEK −−  and ( )( )*12 )( bpEK − . (.)K  is the distribution of auction costs 
as estimated by the initial acquirer.  An increase in auction costs [a shift of (.)K  to the right], 
puts more weight on the initial acquirer’s profit for negotiation success [ )( *11 bv − ] and 
correspondingly less weight on profit given negotiation failure [ ( ))( 1Acquirer2 vE Π ]. As 
                                                 
9
 Proofs are available upon request from the authors. 
10
 We explore in Appendix C the consequences of an increase in the number of rivals in the second-stage 
takeover battle, the probability of negotiation failure and the initial acquirer and target expected profits. 
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( ) *11Acquirer21*1*1*11 )()(1)( bvEbFbbv N ∂Π∂=−≤−=∂−∂ − , we conclude that an increase in 
auction costs leads to a decrease in *1b . This leads to our second proposition: 
Proposition 2.  An increase in auction costs decreases the equilibrium initial acquirer 
offer *1b  during the negotiation phase.   
In the sequel to the paper, we propose an empirical test of the two propositions derived in 
this section. 
3. Empirical evidence 
This section first describes and justifies the M&A sample and then discusses the 
dependent, independent and control variables.  Next, strategies are formulated to overcome 
various econometric difficulties.  Finally empirical findings are reported.   
3.1. Sample description 
The sample of acquisitions is extracted from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database.  Because we require information from the SEC 
filings, our extraction period is from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2006 (SEC filings are 
publicly available through the EDGAR system of the SEC beginning on the first of these 
dates).  We identify 2,677 completed deals that meet the following criteria:  
1. Both the target and the bidder are listed U.S. firms.  SEC filings are available only for 
listed firms.  Moreover, potential determinants of the bid premium, such as the target 
run-up (Schwert, 1996) or the ratio of acquirer to target Tobin’s q (Servaes, 1991) are 
computed from market information. 
2. The acquisition is significant as in Masulis et al.  (2007).  More precisely, the acquirer 
increases shareholdings in the target from less than 50% before the announcement to 
100% afterward and the deal value disclosed in SDC is above $1 million and 
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represents more than 1% of the acquirer’s market value measured 40 days before the 
announcement date. 
3. The bid premium in percentage (computed using the target market price four weeks 
prior to the announcement date) is available in the SDC database. 
We require moreover that (i) the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index (GIM index) 
is available for the acquirer (to control for corporate governance issues) and (ii) the IBES 
database provides financial analysts’ forecasts for acquirer long term earnings growth (to 
control for uncertainty about acquirer value (Moeller et al., 2007). These two additional 
criteria reduce the sample size to 1,076.  The computation of Tobin’s q (and other financial 
ratios) requires data from Compustat database.  Sixty-nine more deals are lost at this step.  
For the 1,007 remaining deals, 754 SEC filings are identifiable from the EDGAR system of 
the SEC (14A and S-4 filings for mergers and 14D filings for tender offers).   Following 
Boone and Mulherin (2007), we use the merger background section of the SEC filings to 
classify the selling procedure as a negotiation or an auction.  It is an auction if multiple 
bidders are mentioned and a negotiation when there is a single buyer.  Using the same SEC 
filings, we also tried to ascertain whether initiator was the target or the winning bidder.11 We 
were able to determine the selling procedure and the initiator for 591 transactions.  Out of 
these 591 transactions, 286 are one-on-one negotiations, and 250 deals are target-initiated. 
Table 2 provides the sample distribution by year.  Four samples are analyzed: SDC is the 
sample comprising the 2,667 acquisitions listed in SDC and obtained using the selection 
criteria described above; SEC Filings is the sub-sample of deals with an identifiable selling 
procedure; Auction is the sub-sample with multiple bidders and Negotiation is the sub-sample 
with a single buyer.   
                                                 
11
 When it is not possible to infer the party initiating the deal between the winning bidder and the target from the 
available SEC filings, we assume that the winning bidder is the initiator. 
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The SDC sample exhibits a peak in the number of transactions between 1997 and 2000, 
which is consistent with the well documented “friendly” M&A wave of the end of the 
nineties (Betton et al., 2008).  The Negotiation, Auction, SDC and SEC filings samples 
display similar patterns from year to year except for a moderate increase in negotiations  
relative to auctions during the years 1998-1999, which corresponds to the peak in the M&A 
market activity. 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics about firms and deals in the samples.  Panel A 
focuses on firm size and allows a direct comparison to the Boone and Mulherin (2007) 
sample.  Panel B reports deal characteristics.  Panel C and D are dedicated to target and 
acquirer characteristics, respectively.  The final column of the table presents the p-value of a 
means test of the null that the Auction and Negotiation sub-samples are equal. The variables 
included in Panels C and D are potential determinants of either the bid premium or the selling 
procedure choice and will be used in our later multivariate analyses.  Variable definitions are 
in Appendix D. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% and 99% to limit the influence of 
outliers.  For industry related variables, we use the Fama-French 49 industry classification 
scheme.  SIC industry codes are obtained from CRSP database and then converted using the 
table provided by Kenneth French on his internet site.12 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
Panel A shows that the sub-samples constructed using the SEC filings focus on larger 
acquirers and targets than the full SDC sample.  This is not surprising since the selection 
criteria include such restrictive requirements as the availability of the GIM index. [Gompers 
et al. (2003) emphasize that firms in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
                                                 
12
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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database are large companies.]  The large difference between the mean (59%) and the median 
(15%) in the relative size of targets to acquirers for the SDC sample highlights the presence 
of many small acquirers that are excluded from the other samples.   
Comparing the Auction and Negotiation sub-samples reveals that auctioned targets are 
significantly smaller firms and are acquired by significantly smaller buyers.  There is also a 
significant difference in relative size: targets are bigger relative to their buyers when there are 
negotiations only. Boone and Mulherin (2007) report similar evidence with respect to target 
and acquirer size. Acquirers are however smaller in their sample ($3.41 billion median size 
versus $4.97 billion in our sample) while targets are bigger ($0.69 billion median size versus 
$0.41 billion in our sample). The difference in relative size between auctions and negotiations 
is not significant in the Boone and Mulherin (2007) sample in contrast with a p-value of .05 
between the relative size means in our sample.   
Panel B provides summary statistics about deal characteristics.  Variable definitions are in 
Appendix D. The toehold dummy indicates acquirers that hold some ownership in the target 
before the deal announcement date. Cash and toehold dummies are computed using 
information from the SDC database and are known to be potential determinants of the bid 
premium [see Table 5 in Betton et al. (2008)]. Since information about deal-initiation has 
been collected from the SEC filings, the target-initiated dummy is not available for the full 
SDC sample.   
All cash deals represent 22.33% of the SEC Filings sample.  This figure is not far from 
the frequency of cash payment in the SDC sample (20.32%).  All cash deals are more 
frequent for auctions than for negotiations.  Boone and Mulherin (2007) report also 
significantly more frequent cash acquisition for auctions than for negotiations in their sample.  
Targets initiate 42.32% of the transactions in the SEC Filings sample.  There is, 
moreover, a large (and significant) difference between auctions and negotiations with respect 
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to deal initiation; target initiate 60.66% of the deals that involve auctions but only 22.73% of 
negotiated deals.  This is consistent with initiating bidders attempting to avoid competition 
and initiating targets seeking to stimulate it.  It strongly suggests that the choice of a selling 
procedure is endogenous and cannot be naively used as an exogenous explanatory variable.  
Note finally that toehold acquisition is rare, as previously documented in the literature. 
Betton et al. (forthcoming) report a short-term toehold frequency – defined as target shares 
acquired in the six months prior to the offer – of only 3% in a sample of 10,806 control 
contests between 1973 and 2002.  The longer-term toehold frequency reported by these 
authors is, however, 13%, which is significantly higher than in our sample.  
Panels C and D provide information on targets and acquirers. Servaes (1991) argues that 
acquirer and target Tobin’s q’s are determinants of takeovers gains but Masulis et al. (2007) 
do not find a connection between acquirer CARs and acquirer Tobin’s q.  Betton et al. (2008) 
show that target book-to-market ratio (a variable closely related to Tobin’s q) is a significant 
determinant of the offer premium.  There might be some underlying mechanism responsible 
for a relation between target Tobin’s q and the selling procedure: good targets (high Tobin’s 
q) being more likely to enter negotiations while targets with low growth opportunities (low 
Tobin’s q) being more likely to resort to auctions.    
Panel C shows that targets q’s are not significantly different between auctioned and 
negotiated deals in our sample.  The ratio of acquirer to target Tobin’s q is, on average, 1.23, 
but the acquirer to target q ratio is not significantly different between auctioned and 
negotiated deals.   
The run-up in the target stock price before the announcement is a known determinant of 
the offer premium (see Schwert, 1996).  The average run-up is 4.75% in our SEC Filings 
sample.  This is less than the 6.84% reported in Betton et al. (forthcoming) for a sample of 
9,418 bids during the period 1973-2002.  Those authors, however, look at the run-up from 
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day -41 to day -2 relative to the announcement date while we use day -39 to day -11.  The last 
days before the announcement date may explain the difference, since there is undoubtedly 
leakage in some cases.  There is no significant difference in run-up between auctions and 
negotiations. 
Hansen (2001) argues that competitive information is one of the determinants of the 
selling procedure choice (in particular, targets are willing to limit the number of bidders when 
sensitive competitive information may be revealed during the selling process).  We use target 
intangibles (these include R&D investments, patents, etc) scaled by total assets as a proxy for 
the presence of sensitive information.  No significant difference emerges between auctions 
and negotiations.  The high average percentage of target intangibles in our SEC Filings 
sample (10% of total assets) is, however, consistent with a high proportion of deals in R&D 
intensive industries (28.6% compared to 12.89% in the full SDC sample).  Note also that the 
proportions of targets from R&D intensive industries, regulated industries and states with 
strong takeover impediments are comparable between auctions and negotiations. 
Betton et al. (2008) emphasize that the selling procedure might depend on the complexity 
of the target (auctions being more suited to simple and standardized target).  We proxy the 
complexity of targets activities with the sales concentration ratio (using the Compustat 
Segment database) which declines with the number and variety of the firm activities and 
hence is a negative indicator of complexity.  No significant difference appears between 
auctions and negotiations, however. 
We report also the average and median target debt ratio for the different samples because 
this ratio will be used to proxy for target shareholders’ eagerness to sell.  Approximately one 
third of targets’ total assets are financed by debt. This proportion is remarkably stable across 
the different samples. 
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Masulis et al. (2007) investigate the relations between corporate governance variables and 
acquirer returns.  The relation between anti-takeover devices, one of the components of the 
GIM index, and the offer premium is investigated in Betton et al. (2008).  In our SEC Filings 
sample, the average acquirer GIM index is 9.49, very close to the 9.45 reported in Masulis et 
al. (2007). Auctions and negotiations appear to differ for this indicator: acquirers display 
higher GIM indexes in auctions than in negotiations.  Hence, management teams making 
more competitive acquisitions appear to be less exposed to the shareholder pressure. 
Moeller et al. (2007) study the interaction between the mode of payment, acquirer returns 
and diversity of opinions about the acquirer’s value.  The standard deviation of long term 
earnings per share growth forecasts across financial analysts, one of the two proxies used by 
the authors to capture the diversity of opinions, is not significantly different between auctions 
and negotiations in our sample.  Its average value in our SEC Filings sample, 3.34, is lower 
than the 5.08 average value reported by Moeller et al. (2007).  The average size of acquirers 
in their sample of 1,533 transactions (period 1980-2002) is $5.7 billion, smaller than the 
$14.09 billion average size in our SEC Filings sample.  This difference in size probably 
explains the difference in the diversity of opinions (smaller firms are presumably more 
opaque). 
3.2. Bid premium  
Our dependent variable is the bid premium in percentage, defined as the share price 
offered by the winning bidder deflated by the price of the target four weeks prior to the 
announcement date. 
The bid premium has several advantages (see Eckbo, forthcoming): (i) our main 
theoretical prediction is about the bid premium (see Section 2.2), (ii) bid premiums are not 
contaminated by investor revisions of the acquirer’s value; e.g., due to a signal conveyed by 
the mode of payment (Travlos, 1987), due the exercise of real options (Hackbarth and 
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Morellec, 2008) or due a revision in the perception of the acquirer’s acquisition strategy 
(Malatesta and Thompson, 1985), (iii) bid premiums are less prone to be affected by rumors 
(the target short-term run-up is included in the premium) and (iv) the bid premium is not 
affected by the probability of deal completion [on the relation between expected bidder gains, 
the probability of deal completion and observed CARs, see, e.g., Betton and Eckbo (2000).]    
Table 4 reports that the average bid premium is 44.33% in the SEC Filings sample, very 
close to the 43.12% in the SDC sample.  Betton et al. (2008) find an average bid premium of 
the same magnitude.   Our bid premiums are also very close to those reported by Bates et al.  
(2006); in their sample of 3,918 transactions (extracted from the SDC database, for the period 
1988-2003) the average premium is 50.1% for deals without toeholds and 39.9% for deals 
with toeholds.  The authors compute the premium over a 42-day period, somewhat longer the 
4-week period that we use.  Note finally that we find no significant difference between 
auctions and negotiations for the bid premium.  This is consistent with competition being as 
strong for negotiated as for auctioned deals. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
3.3. Proxies for ex ante competition and auction costs 
Ex ante competition is, by nature, not observable.  In the theoretical analysis introduced 
in Section 2.2, it is associated with the number of rivals that the initial bidder and target 
anticipate for a second-stage auction if negotiations fail.  It involves perceptions of the 
negotiating parties.  We introduce four proxies for ex ante competition:   
M&A waves.  During M&A waves, competition is intense among bidders to acquire 
targets.  We use the algorithm proposed by Harford (2005) to detect industry M&A waves, 
implemented as follows:  We extract a large sample of M&A transactions from the SDC 
database for the period 1992-2007, focusing on completed transactions involving U.S. 
targets, with a deal sizes over $50 million.  There are 7,510 such transactions.  Next, we 
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assign each transaction to one of the 49 Fama-French industries based on the target’s 
industry.  Then, for each industry and for each sub-period (1992-2000 and 2001-2007), we 
identify the highest 24-month concentration of merger involving firms in that industry.  This 
produces two candidate M&A waves.  Finally, we test whether the candidate M&A waves 
are statistically significant waves using a non-parametric test.13 
This procedure identifies 75 significant industry waves during the period 1992-2007, 
considerably more than the 35 industry waves reported in Harford (2005) during the period 
1981-2000.  Among the potential explanations for this difference are (i) the very active M&A 
market during 2003-2007, (ii) the shorter total period [eight years in our case against ten in 
Harford (2005)], which, however, reduces the probability of observing a candidate wave and 
(iii) inclusion of a more recent period when the SDC database coverage is more extensive, 
(iv) exclusion of the quiet 1981-1990 era [only 9 out of the 35 waves detected by Harford 
(2005) are in this earlier period.] 
Table 4 presents some summary statistics for the wave dummy.  37.56% of the deals in 
the SEC Filings sample are announced within an industry M&A wave.  This is slightly more 
than the proportion observed for the more comprehensive SDC sample (32.51%).  There is no 
difference between auctions and negotiations.   
Using M&A waves to proxy for ex ante competition raises the issue of hindsight because 
it exploits ex-post observations of M&As in a given industry over a long period (eight years 
in our case).  This is not observable by acquirers and targets during negotiations; hence one 
could argue M&A waves cannot represent a valid determinant of the bid premium.   
However, the negotiating parties could assess the probability of being in the midst of an 
industry M&A wave.  In accordance with this notion, we use a second version of the wave 
dummy, the predicted wave variable, an estimated probability of being in an industry M&A 
                                                 
13
 The non-parametric test of significance is described in Harford (2005). It is based on a numerical simulation 
of the frequency distribution of M&As in a given industry under the null hypothesis of no wave. 
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wave.  This probability is estimated from a logit model, where the dependent variable is 1.0 if 
the industry-month is in a merger wave.  We use a set of determinants (taken from Harford 
(2005)14; see Panel E of Appendix D) known to the negotiating parties; all these determinants 
are measured at the year-end prior to the acquisition announcement.    
Table 5 presents the results of the logit estimation.  As expected, high market valuation 
and economic shock15 increase the probability of being in an industry M&A wave (see 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).  Consistent with Harford (2005), the coefficient of 
the interaction variable between economic shock and tight capital variable16 is negative.  This 
suggests that industry M&A waves are more likely when there are favorable financing 
conditions.  
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
Table 4 reports also descriptive statistics about the predicted wave variable. They confirm 
the results obtained with the wave dummy variable.  The average probability of being in an 
industry wave for the SEC Filings sample is comparable to the average probability for the 
larger SDC sample and there is no significant difference between auctions and negotiations. 
Since the predicted wave variable is estimated from a logit model, its use later as an 
independent variable raises the issue of valid inferences with generated regressors.  Section 
3.4 explains our econometric approach to resolve this problem. 
Deal Frequency.  The wave variables introduced so far do not provide information on the 
intensity of the M&A wave.  A waves may be imputed because a few M&As occur an 
                                                 
14
 We only omit the deregulatory events variable, because the list of events provided in Harford (2005) ends in 
1996. 
15
 The economic shock index is the first component of a principal component analysis realized on a set of seven 
variables: the median absolute change of net income over sales, asset turnover, R&D, capital expenditures, 
employee growth, ROA and sales growth, computed for each industry-year. 
16
 The tight capital variable is a dummy variable taking value one when, for a given industry, the median 
market-to-book ratio is below its industry-specific time-series median or the C&I load rate spread is above its 
time-series median. 
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industry where they are rare or, conversely, a wave may be due to a very intensive 
restructuring processes.  To capture the wave intensity, we introduce a deal frequency 
variable, is defined as the number of deals in a given industry during a given period divided 
by the number of firms in that industry at the beginning of the period.   
Deal frequency is estimated by both quarter and semester to examine whether the results 
are robust periodicity.  We also estimate a value-weighted (by deal size) version of the deal 
frequency variable.  It turns out that value-weighting has no effect on the results so we do not 
report them in the paper. 
The use of the contemporaneous deal frequency (by contemporaneous, we mean the deal 
frequency during the quarter or of the semester when the M&A transaction is announced) 
raises two issues.  First, if the M&A transaction is announced at the beginning of the period, 
it precedes most of the deals used in computing deal frequency; thus, deal frequency might be 
a poor proxy for ex ante competition perceived by the negotiating parties.  Second, 
contemporaneous deal frequency might be endogenous to the bid premium; i.e., a low bid 
premium might attract other buyers to the industry.  We solve the two issues by lagging deal 
frequency by one quarter or semester relative to the M&A transaction announcement date. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics about the lagged deal frequency variables.  By 
construction, the semester deal frequency is roughly twice the quarter deal frequency.  Deal 
frequency is economically significant: for the SEC Filings sample, the number of M&As in 
the industry during the previous quarter (semester) is on average 4.81% (9.01%) of the firms 
belonging to that industry.  This is comparable to the average deal frequency of 4.65% 
(8.81%) for the full SDC sample.  No significant difference is observed between auctions and 
negotiations.  
Buyout fund activities.  Private buyout funds have grown dramatically during the past 
decade and they could be strong competitors [using a sample of 870 listed U.S. targets during 
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the period 2003-2007, Boone and Mulherin (2008b) show that the percentage of winning bids 
by private equity firms have risen from 6% to 30%.]  So, as an additional proxy for ex ante 
competition, we use the aggregate investment by U.S. private buyout funds by year, as 
reported by the SDC VentureXpert database, divided by the aggregate NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ market value (computed using the CRSP database)..   
Even though private buyout funds have grown significantly, Table 4 shows that their 
aggregate investments remain rather modest relative to total U.S. market value.  The 
proportions are comparable for the SEC Filings and SDC samples but there is a marginally 
significant difference (p-value of 0.08) between auctions and negotiations.  Negotiated deals 
seem to occur when buyout funds are more active.  This is consistent either with bidders 
preferring negotiations when competition is more severe or buyout firms simply being less 
willing to participate in auctions.    
Economic recession.  Our last proxy for ex ante competition is economic recession, which 
is known to inhibit M&A activity.  A recent and typical example involve the so-called 
“friendly merger wave” of the nineties that vanished with the 2001 recession.  An underlying 
cause might be tightening financing conditions during recessions (see, e.g., Harford, 2005; 
Betton et al., 2008), which cuts the number of potential buyers and reduces competition.  The 
NBER identifies one economic recession during our 1994-2006 sample period, from March 
2001 to November 2001.  Table 4 reports that 5.60% of the SDC sample and 4.91% of the 
SEC Filings sample occurred during this recession.  No significant difference appears to exist 
between auctions and negotiations.   
Our four proxies for ex ante competition are aimed at capturing the same latent factor.  If 
valid, they should be highly correlated.  Panel A of Table 6 presents the correlation 
coefficients matrix between the ex ante competition proxies for the sub-sample of 
negotiations. Statistical significance of the correlation coefficients is assessed using a 
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classical student test. The statistical significance of the correlation coefficient between the 
deal frequency variables is not reported because the two variables overlap by one quarter As 
expected, the wave dummy and the predicted wave variable are significantly correlated to 
each other and to the lagged deal frequency (by quarter or by semester).  Private buyout fund 
activity is correlated with predicted industry waves and more marginally (at the 10% level) 
with lagged deal frequency by semester.  Correlations between the recession dummy and the 
wave variables are negative and significant, as expected.  It is also negatively correlated and 
marginally significant (at the 10% level) with lagged deal frequency by quarter.  However, 
the recession dummy is not significantly correlated with buyout activity.   
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
In Section 2.2, the private component of auction costs for the target shareholders is 
mainly defined as the eagerness to sell. Organizing an auction takes time and when target 
shareholders are under pressure to sell (for whatever reason), they will be more willing to 
accept the first stage initial acquirer’s offer. The eagerness to sell is, however, not observable 
per se. We use the target debt ratio as a proxy. Our intuition is simply that longer negotiations 
and sale periods are costly when the target leverage is high. Not only do interest expenses go 
on during this period but capital reimbursement outflows can put a lot of pressure on targets 
(especially for fast growing firms).  Alternatively, one might argue that the debt ratio could 
proxy instead for a target’s poor financial health. We explore this possibility in Panel B of 
Table 6 where we report correlations between the target’s debt ratio, Tobin’s q, market to 
book and return on assets. The target’s debt ratio is positively and significantly correlated 
with its market to book ratio and its return on assets in our sample of negotiated deals. This 
shows that the target’s debt ratio does not act here as a proxy of poor financial health. 
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3.4. Econometric method 
Two econometric issues, endogeneity and generated regressors, can possibly influence the 
estimated relation between ex ante competition and bid premiums.  
3.4.1. Endogenous sample selection 
Targets might voluntarily avoid one-on-one negotiations.  This is suggested by Panel B of 
Table 3, which reports that only 22.73% of the negotiated deals are initiated by the target.  
Consequently, our negotiation sample cannot be considered a random sub-sample of the SEC 
Filings sample; there is endogenous sample selection.  We follow Li and Prabhala (2007) and 
adopt Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure for adjusting estimates and Greene (2008, pp. 
886-887) for standard-error computations.  In the first stage, the probability of being included 
in a sub-sample (the Negotiation sub-sample in our case) is estimated using a probit model fit 
with the SEC Filings sample.  The dependent variable is a dummy indicating one-on-one 
negotiations.  The independent variables are mostly analogous to those in Table 12 in Boone 
and Mulherin (2008a).  More specifically, we use target intangibles, relative deal size, 
acquirer size, stock payment, target-initiated deal, industry count (the number of firms in the 
target’s Fama-French industry with a market value greater than the market value of the target 
in the year prior to the merger) and a strong anti-takeover state (a dummy indicating targets 
that are incorporated in states with strong takeover impediments). We add to this list the 
target Tobin’s q ratio, R&D intensive industry and target sales concentration (see Section 3.1 
for justifications of these additions). Variable definitions are in Appendix D. 
Let iw  denote the vector of control variables for deal i and γˆ  the vector of coefficient 
estimates obtained by maximum likelihood.  For each transaction in the Negotiation sub-
sample, the Heckman’s Lambda is ( ) ( ).ˆ'ˆ'ˆ γΦγφλ iii ww= , where φ  and Φ  denote the 
Gaussian probability density function and the Gaussian cumulative density function, with 
mean zero and unit variance, respectively.  In the second stage, when regressing the bid 
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premium on proxies for ex ante competition (plus other variables) for the Negotiation sub-
sample, Heckman’s Lambda is added as an additional regressor.   
Table 7 reports the estimation of the first-stage probit model.  Non-cash (stock) payment 
significantly increases the probability of negotiations.  Target initiation has the opposite 
effect, which is consistent with the univariate evidence, reported in Panel B of Table 3, that 
target-initiators prefer auctions to negotiations.  Industry count reduces the probability of 
negotiations but is only marginally significant (p-value of 0.10).  The other variables are not 
statistically significant.   
 [Insert Table 7 About Here] 
3.4.2. Generated regressors 
The predicted wave variable, one of our proxies for ex ante competition, is a generated 
regressor.  To circumvent any potential problem, we adopt the approach advocated in Greene 
(2008, p. 509), which is based on the asymptotic distribution of the two-stage maximum 
likelihood estimator derived in Murphy and Topel (1985).  In our case, the first stage 
estimates the predicted wave variable with a logit model.  The second stage is an OLS linear 
regression of the bid premium on the predicted wave and a set of other control variables 
(including Heckman’s Lambda when working with the Negotiation sub-sample).  Under the 
assumption of normality of the residuals of the second-stage linear model, the OLS estimator 
is the maximum likelihood (see Greene, 2008, p. 518).  Murphy and Topel (1985) provide the 
general expression for the asymptotic covariance matrix of the second-stage maximum 
likelihood estimator: 
( )[ ]211122*2 "''1 VRCVCRVCCVVV
n
V −−+=       (13) 
where n  is the number of observations, 2V  is the asymptotic covariance matrix of the second 
stage estimator (linear regression in our case), 1V  is the asymptotic covariance matrix of the 
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first-stage estimator (the logit model in our case), and the matrices C  and R  are obtained 
using the following relations: 
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where 1ln L  is the log-likelihood of the first-stage model, 1θ  is the vector of coefficients of 
the first-stage model, 2ln L  is the log-likelihood of the second-stage model and 2θ  is the 
vector of coefficients of the second-stage model.   The matrices 1V  and 2V  are estimated 
using the BHHH estimator (Berndt et al., 1974).  The matrices R  and C  are estimated using 
the corresponding sample averages, computed at the estimated values of the coefficients 
vectors.  The main diagonal of the matrix *2V  provides the variances of the coefficients 
estimated at the second stage, adjusted for the presence of a generated regressor. 
To apply the Murphy and Topel (1985), we must assume normality for the residuals from 
the linear regression estimated at the second stage.  This is required for OLS to be maximum 
likelihood (in Section 4, we check the impact of the normality assumption using bootstrap.)   
3.5. Results 
Table 8 reports the effects of several ex ante competition proxies for negotiations and the 
target debt ratio (our proxy for auction costs) on the bid premium. The bid premium is the 
dependent variable in all specifications.  The columns have different proxies for ex ante 
competition: (1) wave dummy, (2) predicted wave, (3) deal frequency previous quarter, (4) 
deal frequency previous semester, (5) buyout fund activities and (6) NBER recession dummy.  
Each specification includes the target debt ratio and the following control variables: cash, 
toehold, target run-up, target size, target Tobin’s q, acquirer idiosyncratic risk, acquirer to 
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target q ratio, acquirer GIM index, standard deviation across analysts’ forecasts of the 
acquirer’s long term earnings growth.  Variable definitions are in Appendix D.   
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
The coefficients for five proxies of ex ante competition out of six are at least marginally 
significant with the expected sign.  Deal frequencies lagged a quarter and a semester and 
buyout activities are strongly significant while wave and NBER recession have p-values of 
0.09 and 0.10 respectively.  Even the least significant variable, predicted wave, has the right 
sign and a p-value of 0.15.  We note also that in all specification, the target debt ratio has a 
negative and significant coefficient.  The overall picture that emerges is as follows. The signs 
of all proxies of ex ante competition are consistent with Proposition 1 of Section 2 (ex ante 
competition has a positive impact on the bid premium). Ex ante competition proxies are 
economically significant.  An increase in the deal frequency during the previous quarter by 
10% leads to an increase in the bid premium by 13.6% on average.  Bid premiums are, on 
average, 7.5% higher during M&A waves.  During recessions bid premium are reduced by 
15% on average. Targets that negotiate under the pressure of their debt agree to accept a 
lower premium: the higher the auction costs perceived by the seller, the lower the premium.  
This is consistent with Proposition 2 of Section 2. The coefficient of the Heckman’s lambda 
is always negative but never statistically significant.  Endogenous sample selection seems not 
to be a major issue for our sample of negotiations. 
Some of the control variables are interesting. The relation between target run-up and the 
bid premium is positive and significant in four specifications out of six.  This is consistent 
with results previously reported in the literature (see, Schwert, 1996; Betton et al., 2000).  
The bid premium decreases with target size [a result also reported in Betton et al. (2008)] and 
increases with target Tobin’s q (shareholders of more valuable firms obtain higher premiums) 
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and with acquirer idiosyncratic risk [which is consistent with the arguments and empirical 
evidence in Moeller et al. (2007).] 
4. Robustness checks and additional evidence 
This section reports three robustness checks: (1) expanding the set of control variables, 
(2) testing the normality of residuals in regressions where the predicted M&A wave is the 
proxy for ex ante competition (3) and testing whether our proxies of ex ante competition are 
correlated with the gains that accrue to the merging parties; (to ascertain whether the positive 
impact of our proxies on the bid premium could arise from their relation to the wealth 
creation of the merger rather than to the pressure of competition among potential bidders). 
Finally, in an effort to explain why our results contrast with previous findings, we apply 
the same methods to a broader sample, SEC filings, which includes both negotiations and 
auctions.  
4.1. Additional control variables 
To check for possible missing variables, we added the following constructs:  
- The dormant period, the time (in months) since a previous acquisition announcement in 
the industry of the target.  Song and Walkling (2000) use the dormant period to measure 
the degree of surprise.  Since most of our ex ante competition proxies are based on 
industry takeover activity, the dormant period might be correlated with them and have 
even more power.  Moreover, the dormant period might relate to later bid premiums 
because an M&A deal could lead investors to anticipate others in the same industry; this 
could induce an upward revision in the prices of industry firms and result in lower bid 
premiums when a potential target becomes an actual target. 
- Acquirer free cash flow.  Jensen (1986) argues that acquirers with large free cash-flow are 
more willing to undertake value-destroying deals to pursue personal objectives.   
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- Executive insider ownership, because it reduces agency conflicts between managers and 
their shareholders.  Insiders are presumably reluctant to undertake value-destroying 
transactions, so they could be less aggressive bidders (Lewellen et al., 1985). 
- A proxy for hubris-infected CEOs, who are too confident of their valuations and thus 
overbid (Roll, 1986). Our proxy for hubris is based on the observed insider trading 
activities of acquirer CEOs prior to the announcement date. 
- The average industry deal CAR during the year prior to the announcement date, to control 
for industry attractiveness.  Perhaps our proxies of ex ante competition are just picking up 
target industry desirability.  Of course, an attractive industry is likely to entice numerous 
competitive acquirers, so attractiveness and ex ante competition are not mutually 
exclusive.  From a buyer’s perspective, a given industry is attractive if acquisitions are 
wealth-creating.  This is the rationale for using the average deal CAR observed for M&A 
transaction in the industry of the target during year prior to the announcement date.   
These variables are defined in Appendix D.  Table 9 follows the same organization as 
Table 8. Each column corresponds to a given proxy of ex ante competition and the 
econometric methods are the same as in Table 8.  Unfortunately, lack of availability for some 
of the five new control variables significantly reduces the sample sizes.  Our Negotiation sub-
sample is now limited to 129 observations.   
The main lessons from Table 9 are as follows. The statistical significance of most proxies 
is reinforced (despite the sample size reduction) and, most often, the associated coefficients 
increase.  The only exception is the NBER recession variable, for which the coefficient 
remains negative but becomes insignificant. The inclusion of additional control variables 
does not weaken the impact of ex ante competition on bid premiums. The target debt ratio 
coefficient remains uniformly negative but is statistically significant now in only three of the 
six specifications. Concerning control variables previously present in Table 8, target size, 
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target run-up and acquirer idiosyncratic risk remain significant but target Tobin’s q loses its 
significance. Among the new control variables, the acquirer’s management insider ownership 
is significant with a negative coefficient in specification (1).  This is consistent with less 
agency conflict.  The average industry deal CAR prior to the announcement date is not 
significant; so the previous results seem uncontaminated by industry attractiveness.  Lastly, 
the Heckman’s Lambda coefficient keeps its negative sign and becomes marginally 
significant in one specification out of six. Table 9 brings some support to the idea that, if 
endogenous sample-selection plays a role, it leads to lower bid premiums for negotiations on 
average. 
[Insert Table 9 About Here] 
4.2. Robustness of the Murphy and Topel (1985) adjustment for non-normality 
The predicted wave variable is a generated regressor from a first-stage logit model (see 
Section 3.3 and Table 5).  In Tables 8 and 9, we use the Murphy and Topel (1985) theorem to 
adjust the p-values reported in column (2).  The adjustment procedure is described in Section 
3.4.2 and relies on the assumption that residuals in the second-stage regression are Gaussian.  
Kolmogorov tests of normality reject normality with a high level of confidence (p-value < 
0.01).   
Consequently, we need to check whether the p-values reported in Table 8 and 9 are robust 
to the observed non-normality.  Table 10 provides this check.  It reports a percentile-t 
bootstrap based on case-by-case resampling (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993), which is known to 
converge fast (Horowitz, 2002) and should perform well even in small samples.   
Table 10 compares the Murphy and Topel (1985) adjusted p-values to percentile-t 
boostrap p-values* when the predicted wave variable is the proxy for ex ante competition.  
The bootstrap p-values are generally similar to the p-values from Table 8.  Hence it seems 
safe to conclude that the overall inferences are sound even though the second-stage 
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regression residuals depart from normality. Note that the predicted wave variable now 
becomes marginally significant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.10. 
[Insert Table 10 About Here] 
4.3. Ex ante competition proxies and gains from the trade 
An alternative explanation for the above empirical results might be that our proxies of ex 
ante competition actually capture the gains (the synergies) of the merger.17  To check this 
possibility, Table 11 replicates the analyses presented in Table 8, but this time with the value 
weighted deal CAR (i.e., weighted bidder and target CARs) as dependent variable. The value 
weighted deal CAR represents the market’s assessment of the gains from the merger. The 
conclusion that emerges from Table 11 is unambiguous: none of our ex ante competition 
proxies has a statistically significant relation with the value weighted deal CAR. This rules 
out one potential source of ambiguity. Note also that the target debt ratio is not significant in 
any of the specifications presented in Table 11.  This reinforces the notion that the target debt 
ratio does not seem to proxy for (bad) target quality in our sample. 
[Insert Table 11 About Here] 
4.4. Additional evidence 
Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008a) also present results on the relations among 
competition, bid premiums, acquirer and target CARs and transaction procedures. They find 
that competition (measured using information extracted from SEC filings about the private 
takeover process) does not affect acquirers’ CARs and bid premiums.  This apparent absence 
of a relation between the observed number of bidders, bid premiums and acquirer CARs has 
also been reported in other studies.  Betton et al. (2008, Table V), for example, using a 
sample of 4,889 U.S. control contests for U.S. public targets over the period 1980-2002, 
                                                 
17
 We are indebted to Robert Hansen for pointing out this possibility. 
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report a negative but not statistically significant effect of competition (measured by a dummy 
variable for takeovers with multiple bidders) on the final offer premium.   
This section explores one potential explanation of these previously-reported results, 
which are in conflict with ours; viz., the samples of M&A deals in those studies included both 
negotiated and auctioned deals.  Mixing both types of transactions in the same sample might 
disguise the estimated role of competition. To illustrate this possibility, Table 12 presents 
results analogous to those in Table 8 but for the SEC filings sample (591 transactions), which 
contains negotiated and auctioned deals. 
[Insert Table 12 About Here] 
A clear picture emerges.  Despite a larger sample size, coefficients of the ex ante 
competition proxies are generally lower in absolute magnitude and less statistically 
significant in Table 12 than in Table 8.  Only the predicted wave proxy exhibits an increase in 
statistical significance and out of six proxies for ex ante competition, four are now 
statistically insignificant.  This result makes intuitive sense.  If acquirers choose negotiations 
to avoid competition, one would expect them to be particularly vigilant and to bid high 
enough to deter competition when the likelihood is high that a rival acquirer will appear.  
Thus, the bid premium should be particularly sensitive to the competitive environment in 
negotiations.  In the case of auctioned transactions, the competition is (formally or 
informally) organized by the seller (or his advisors). The level of bid premiums is pushed up 
by this competitive selling procedure and bid premiums appear to be less sensitive to the 
competitive environment. Consequently, a sample of M&A transactions that includes both 
negotiated and auctioned deals does not disentangle the relations among bid premiums, ex 
post competition and ex ante competition.  Finally, it is worth noting (Table 4), that sample 
average bid premiums are comparable between auctions and negotiations. Evidently, 
competitive pressure is present during negotiations even though it is not directly observable.  
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The target debt ratio coefficient loses its statistical significance in all specification. This 
result is again consistent with our theoretical predictions. Auction costs impact the target’s 
behavior during negotiations, not when an auction is actually organized (these costs are sunk 
conditionally on auction organization). 
With respect to the control variables included in the regressions of Table 12, the 
statistically significant toehold coefficient deserves some comment. This is a surprising result 
because it conflicts with Betton et al. (forthcoming), who use a large sample of 5,825 bids 
during the period 1973-2002. We note, however, that toehold is not statistically significant in 
Tables 8 and 9 for negotiations and that toehold might be endogenous to the bid premium.  
As emphasized in Betton et al. (2008), additional investigation is required to better 
understand the relations among bid premiums, toeholds and other potentially endogenous 
deal characteristics. 
We conclude this section by mentioning that analogous empirical methods have been 
applied to a larger sample of 2,398 transactions but with fewer control variables because of 
availability.  The results (not reported for reason of brevity) give no indication that the results 
in Tables 8 to 12 are sample specific. 
5. Conclusion 
The market for corporate control plays an important role as an external control device for 
firms.  Competition is essential for the efficient allocation of management teams among 
firms.  However, based on previous evidence in the financial literature, observed competition 
among acquirers seems to be rather low; the vast majority of deals have only a single bidder.  
Yet there is indirect evidence of competition; most of the gains in acquisitions accrue to the 
target.  These two facts deserve to be reconciled. This paper has emphasized the role of ex 
ante competition, which is not easily observable.  Even if competition seems largely absent 
ex-post, the existence of potential competitors propels bidders toward more competitive 
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actions.  To capture this idea, we model a two-stage takeover process.  The first stage is a 
one-on-one negotiation with the target, conducted under the threat of an auction.  If 
negotiations fail, either a takeover battle among rivals takes place, or an auction is organized 
by the target.  Our theory predicts that higher potential competition perceived by the 
negotiating parties (ex ante competition) draws forth higher first stage bids. 
Next, we turn to an empirical test of this prediction.  Our results are mainly based on a 
hand collected dataset of 591 M&A transactions during 1994-2006.  The merger background 
sections of SEC 14A and S-4 filings for mergers and 14D filings for tender offers allows us 
to isolate a one-on-one negotiations sub-sample that is used to test our theoretical predictions.  
We employ several alternative proxies of ex ante competition: M&A waves, deal frequency 
in the industry, private buyout funds activities and NBER recessions. Our econometric 
methods control for endogenous sample selection (the results imply that the type of procedure 
– negotiation versus auction – is chosen by the deal initiator) and generated regressors.  The 
results are consistent with the initial intuition: ex ante competition significantly increases the 
bid premium for negotiated transactions. 
The results also shed some light on puzzling features of the M&A market.  Why do 
targets’ shareholders so frequently accept negotiated deals, if they would be better off with 
more competitive bidders? Effective ex ante competition can be the explanation.  Let us 
finally mention that our results bear some policy implications. Because auction costs impair 
the role of ex ante competition, a channel for the regulator to improve the effectiveness of the 
market for corporate control as an external corporate governance control device is to lower 
these costs. For example, a legal framework for organizing sales of firms by auctions could 
bring interesting innovations.  
Appendix A: Expected seller revenue in a second price auction with N risk neutral 
symmetric bidders and private values 
Denote by v  a bidder’s valuation. The expected seller revenue is the expected second-
highest valuation since the highest bidder in a second price auction pays the second highest 
bid, (which is the second highest valuation when all bidders bid their valuations.)  Given a 
uniform distribution for v , the cumulative density function of valuations is v . Valuations 
being independent, the probability that the N  bidders valuation will be below v  is NvvF =)( . 
To derive the cumulative density function of the second highest valuation (denoted )()( vF 2 ), 
we note that the second highest valuation will be below v  in two cases: either all N  valuation 
are below v  (which happens with probability Nv ) or one valuation is above v  and the 
remaining 1−N  valuations are below v  (which happens with probability 1)1( −− Nvv ). There 
are N possible occurrences of the latter case. )()2( vF  is therefore equal to ( )1)1( −−+ NN vvNv . 
The corresponding probability density function (denoted )()2( vf ) is )1()1( 2 vvNN N −− − . The 
expected seller revenue can then be written as ∫
1
0 )2(
)( dvvvf . Solving the integral, the expected 
seller revenue appears to be )1()1( +− NN . Note finally that, by revenue equivalence, this 
result holds quite generally (first-price sealed-bid auctions, second-price sealed-bid auctions, 
English auctions and Dutch auctions, among others). 
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Appendix B: Formal description of the negotiation under the threat of an auction game 
 Game description.  The player set for our extensive game is {acquirer, target}.  We 
denote by Ø the start of the game, by b1 the acquirer’s bid during the negotiation phase, and 
by b2 the initial acquirer’s bid during the second stage takeover battle.  The actions available 
to the target during the negotiation phase are {Accept, Refuse}.  Terminal histories are (b1, 
Accept) and (b1, Refuse, b2).  The player function P(.) is P(Ø) = acquirer, P(b1) = target and 
P(b1, Refuse) = acquirer.  The game encompasses three sub-games: Γ(Ø), Γ(b1) and Γ(b1, 
Refuse).   
Players’ types and preferences.  We assume risk neutrality, so the acquirer’s and target’s 
preferences are fully described by their expected payoffs.  We denote by v1 the target 
valuation of the initial acquirer (the acquirer starting the negotiation phase) and by vi the 
valuation of a given acquirer i.  vi is a function of the market value of the target (common 
knowledge) and the synergies the acquirer anticipates.  The synergies are private to the 
acquirer and define its type.18 We note that vi is strictly increasing in synergies.  Rivals during 
the second-stage takeover battle are referred to as i=2…N (there are therefore N−1 rivals at 
this stage).  The acquirer and the target have imperfect knowledge of the valuations vi of 
potential rivals acquirers.  We denote the distribution of vi by F(.).  Knowledge of F(.), which 
responds to the conditions of a cumulative density function, is common to the acquirer and 
the target.19 That amounts to assuming that rival valuations are independent and identically 
distributed.  v(i) denotes the order statistic of vi for the N−1 rivals.  So, v(1) is the maximum of 
(v2, …, vN). 
                                                 
18
 This private value framework is more suited to strategic transactions, where the value creation is specific to 
the complementarities between the acquirer’s and the target’s activities, than to financial transactions, in which 
the value creation depends on factors available to any acquirer (see Bulow et al., 1999).  
19
 To be more precise, our approach adopts a distributional strategy (see Milgrom, 2004). If ti denotes the 
acquirer type, we assume that ti follows a [0,1] uniform distribution and that F(.) is some invertible function 
defined by vi=F-1(ti), the inverse of the valuation function.  
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Appendix C: Ex ante competition, the probability of negotiation failure and initial 
acquirer and target expected profits. 
Proposition 1 allows us to explore the consequences of an increase in the number of rivals 
in the second-stage takeover battle on the first stage probability of refusal and the initial 
acquirer and target expected profits (for ease of discussion, we consider N−1 as a continuous 
variable):20 
- At the first stage, the target shareholders’ decision problem is to choose between 
)( 1 Tvb −  and [ ]cvpE T −−)( 2  [see Eq. (9)] and as shown in Section 2.2.4, both terms are 
increasing in N−1, we conclude that )( Target1ΠE  is increasing in N–1.   
- The probability of the initial acquirer’s offer being rejected is ( )*12 )( bpEK − .  It’s 
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 can be either positive or negative depending on the magnitude of 
the two derivatives.  The effect of the number of rivals in the second-stage takeover battle 
on the probability of the target shareholders rebuffing the initial acquirer’s first-stage 
offer is ambiguous.  The expected price in the second stage increases but the equilibrium 
bid *1b  also increases.  Which effect dominates depends on K(.) (the distribution of the 
second-stage takeover battle costs as perceived by the initial acquirer) and F(.) (the 
distribution of the potential rivals’ valuations in the second-stage takeover battle, as 
                                                 
20
 N-1 can be dealt with as a discrete variable, as it has been done up to now, but this is somewhat tedious. An 
alternative approach is to interpret N−1 as the ex ante perception of the potential competition strength in the 
second stage. Our results do not depend on this simplifying assumption. 
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anticipated by both the initial acquirer and the target’s shareholders).  This ambiguous 
relation between ex ante competition and the probability of the negotiations failing may 
be one of the elements explaining why it is difficult to empirically find a negative relation 
between the ex post observed number of bidders and the acquirer’s abnormal returns (see 
Boone and Mulherin (2008a)).   
- The initial acquirer’s expected profit is given by Eq. (12).  An increase in N–1 lowers 
both the payoff in the event of successful negotiations )( *11 bv − , and the payoff in the 
event of a takeover battle ( ( )Acquirer2ΠE ).  So, the initial acquirer’s expected profit clearly 
(and intuitively) decreases as the number of rivals in the takeover battle increases. 
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Appendix D: Variables definitions 
(COMPUSTAT is the source of variables referred to by item number) 
Variable Description 
Panel A. Dependent Variables 
Bid Premium 
The share price offered by the winning bidder to target shareholders 
deflated by the price of the target four weeks prior to the announcement 
date. 
Panel B. Ex ante Competition Proxies 
Wave Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is announced during a wave detected using the algorithm in Harford (2005), 0 otherwise.  
Predicted Wave 
Output of a logit model where the dependent variable is the wave dummy 
variable. Table 5 reports on estimation of the logit model. The 
explanatory are defined in Panel E here below. 
Deal Frequency 
Previous Quarter 
The number of deals announced in the target industry during the previous 
quarter divided by the number of firms in that industry at the beginning of 
the previous quarter.  
Deal Frequency 
Previous Semester 
The number of deals announced in the target industry during the previous 
semester divided by the number of firms in that industry at the beginning 
of the previous semester.  
Buyout Activities 
The ratio of aggregate buyout funds investments in the U.S. to aggregate 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ market value during the year of the 
transaction announcement date.  
NBER Recession Dummy variable: 1 if the transaction occurred during a recession period (between March 2001 and November 2001), 0 otherwise. 
Panel C. Main control variables 
Firm Characteristics 
Size 
Market value of equity (number of shares outstanding multiplied by the 
stock price) at day -40 relative to the announcement date in billions of 
dollars. The regressions use the natural log of this variable. 
Relative Size Ratio of target size to acquirer size. 
Tobin’s q Ratio Market value of assets over book value of assets:  (item6 − item60 + item25 * item199) / item6. 
Acquirer to Target q 
Ratio Tobin’s q of the acquirer divided by Tobin’s q of the target. 
Run-up 
Cumulative abnormal returns from day -39 to day -11 relative to the deal 
announcement date, where the abnormal returns are obtained using the 
beta-one model, which subtracts the daily market portfolio return from 
the daily return of each company. 
Intangibles Firm intangibles over total assets: item33 / item6. 
Sales Concentration 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index of the firm’s sales (the 
sum of squares of sales shares by industry). Sales by industry are obtained 
using the COMPUSTAT Segment database. 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
Standard deviation of abnormal returns from day -200 to day -40 relative 
to the announcement date. Abnormal returns are obtained using the beta-
one model, which subtracts the daily market portfolio return from the 
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daily return of each company. 
GIM Index 
The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index constructed using 
information from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
database. Higher index levels correspond to more managerial power. 
St.Dev. of EPS 
Forecasts 
Standard deviation of long term earnings per share growth forecasts by 
financial analysts; data the Thomson Financial I/B/E/S database. 
Debt Ratio Long term debt plus current liabilities divided by total assets 
Market to Book  The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
Return on Assets Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets 
Target’s Industry Characteristics 
R&D Intensive Industry 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target belongs to the top seven most R&D 
intensive industries among the 49 Fama-French industries. Industry R&D 
intensiveness is the average value of the R&D ratio for industry firms. 
The R&D ratio is R&D expenses (item46) by total assets (item6).  
Regulated Industry 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target belongs to one of the following Fama-
French industries: Utilities, Banks, Insurance and Communication, 0 
otherwise. 
Strong Antitakeover 
State 
Dummy variable: 1 for targets incorporated in states determined by 
Bebchuk and Ferrel (2002) to have strong takeover impediments. These 
states are Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.  
Industry Count 
Natural log of the number of firms in the same Fama-French industry as 
the target with a market value greater than the target in the year prior to 
the merger. 
Deal Characteristics 
Cash Dummy variable: 1 for purely cash-financed deals, 0 otherwise. 
Stock Dummy variable: 1 for purely stock-financed deals, 0 otherwise. 
Toehold 
Percentage of stocks held by the acquirer prior to the announcement date. 
Table 3 has a dummy version of this variable, which has a value of 1 if 
the acquirer holds any shares of the target before the announcement date 
and 0 otherwise. 
Target-initiated Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is initiated by the target, 0 otherwise; (collected from the merger background section of the SEC filings.) 
Relative Deal Size Deal size, defined by SDC as the total value of the consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses divided by acquirer size. 
Panel D. Additional control variables 
Dormant Period 
Number of days between the announcement date and the last previous 
significant M&A deal in the industry (4-digit SIC code) of the target (see 
Song and Walkling (2000)), based on 16,736 completed M&A 
transactions in the SDC database that satisfied the following criteria: (i) 
deal size above $1 million, (ii) percentage of shares held before 
transaction below 50%, (iii) percentage of shares held after transaction 
above 50% and (iv) U.S. target. 
Free Cash Flow 
Operating income before depreciation (item 13) minus interest expense 
(item 15) minus income taxes (item 16) minus capital expenditures (item 
128), scaled by total assets (item 6). 
Insider ownership Percentage of acquiring firm’s equity owned by the acquirer’s top 
management as reported in the Compustat ExecuComp database. 
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Hubris-infected CEO 
Dummy variable: 1 if the following two conditions are met: (i) over the 2-
year period prior to the acquisition announcement date, the acquirer’s 
CEO increased net purchases (the difference between shares bought and 
shares sold by the CEO during a given time period) and (ii) over the 1-
year period following the acquisition announcement date, the acquirer’s 
CAR is in the bottom quartile of all acquirers’ 1-year CARs. Acquirer 
CEO insider trading activities are from the Thomson-Reuter Insider 
Filings database. CARs are estimated using the beta-one model, which 
subtracts the daily market portfolio return from the daily return of each 
company. 
Average Industry Deal 
CARt-1 
The arithmetic average CAR for all transactions that occurred during the 
year prior to the announcement date in the target’s Fama-French industry.  
Deal CAR is the average of the acquirer CAR and target CAR weighted 
by their respective market value. Market values are estimated 40 days 
before the announcement date. CARs are estimated using the beta-one 
model, which subtracts the daily market portfolio return from the daily 
return of each company. 
Panel E. Determinants of Merger Waves 
Market-to-Book Industry median market-to-book ratio 
3-Year Return Median return in the industry for the three years prior to the 
announcement. 
σ(3-Year Return) Intra-industry standard deviation of the 3-year return 
C&I Loan Rate Spread 
Difference between the rate charged for commercial and industrial loans 
and the Fed funds rate, as reported in the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank’s 
Survey of Terms of Business Lending. It is used as a proxy for low 
capital liquidity. 
Economic Shock Index 
First principal component of seven economic shock variables (the median 
absolute change of net income over sales, asset turnover, R&D, capital 
expenditures, employee growth, ROA and sales growth), computed for 
each industry-year. 
Tight Capital 
Dummy variable: 1 when, for a given industry, the median market-to-
book ratio is below its industry-specific time-series median or the C&I 
loan rate spread is above its time-series median, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
  
52
References 
Ahern, K., 2009. Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers. Unpublished 
working paper. University of Michigan, Ross School of Business. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., Stafford, E., 2001. New evidence and perspectives on mergers. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103–210. 
Bates, T.W., Lemmon, M.L., Linck, J.S., 2006. Shareholder wealth effects and bid 
negotiation in free-out deals: Are minority shareholders left out in the cold? Journal of 
Financial Economics 81, 681–708. 
Baumol, W.J., 1982. Contestable markets: An uprising in the theory of industry structure. 
American Economic Review 72, 1–15. 
Bebchuk, L., Ferrell, A., 2002. On takeover law and regulatory competition. Business Lawyer 
57, 1047–1068. 
Berndt, E., Hall, B., Hall, R., Hausman, J., 1974. Estimation and inference in nonlinear 
structural models. Annals of Social Measurement 3, 653–665. 
Betton, S., Eckbo, B.E., 2000. Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoffs in takeovers. 
Review of Financial Studies 13, 841–882. 
Betton, S., Eckbo, B.E., Thorburn, K.S., 2008. Corporate takeovers. In: Eckbo, B.E. (Ed.), 
Handbook of Corporate Finance, Empirical Corporate Finance. Elsevier, North-Holland, 
Vol. 2, pp. 291–429. 
Betton, S., Eckbo, B.E., Thorburn, K.S., forthcoming. Merger negotiations and the toehold 
puzzle. Journal of Financial Economics. 
Boone, A.L., Mulherin, H.L., 2007. How are firms sold? Journal of Finance 62, 847–875. 
Boone, A.L., Mulherin, H.L., 2008a. Do auctions induce a winner’s curse? New evidence 
from the corporate takeover market. Journal of Financial Economics 89, 1–19.  
Boone, A.L., Mulherin, H.L., 2008b. Do private equity consortiums impede takeover 
competition? Unpublished working paper. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104224.  
Bulow, J., Klemperer, P., 1996. Auctions versus negotiations. American Economic Review 
86, 180–194.  
Bulow, J., Klemperer, P., 2007. When are auctions best? Unpublished working paper. 
Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1973. 
Bulow, J., Huang, M., Klemperer, P., 1999. Toeholds and takeovers. Journal of Political 
Economy 107, 427–454. 
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Panunzi, F., 2000. Agency conflicts in public and negotiated 
transfers of corporate control. Journal of Finance 55, 647–677. 
Dasgupta, S., Hansen, R.G., 2007. Auctions in corporate finance. In: Eckbo, B.E. (Ed.), 
Handbook of Corporate Finance, Empirical Corporate Finance. Elsevier, North-Holland, 
Vol. 1, pp. 87–144. 
Eckbo, B.E., forthcoming. Bid strategies and takeover premiums: A review. Journal of 
Corporate Finance. 
Efron, B., Tibshirani, R.J., 1993. An Introduction to the Bootstrap. Chapman & Hall, London. 
Fishman, M.J., 1988. A theory of preemptive takeover bidding. RAND Journal of Economics 
19, 88–101. 
Fishman, M.J., 1989. Pre-emptive bidding and the role of the medium of exchange in 
acquisitions. Journal of Finance 44, 41–57. 
  
53
Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., Metrick, A., 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107–155. 
Greene, W.H., 2008. Econometric Analysis (Pearson Prentice Hall).  
Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1980. Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the 
corporation. Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42–64.  
Hackbarth, D., Morellec, E., 2008. Stock returns in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of 
Finance 63. 213–1252. 
Hansen, R.G., 1987. A theory for the choice of exchange medium in mergers and 
acquisitions. Journal of Business 60, 75–95. 
Hansen, R.G., 2001. Auctions of companies. Economic Inquiry 39, 30–43. 
Harford, J., 2005. What drives merger waves? Journal of Financial Economics 77, 529–560. 
Heckman, J.J., 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47, 153–
161. 
Horowitz, J.L., 2002. The bootstrap. In: Heckman, J.J., Leamer, E.E. (Ed.), Handbook of 
Econometrics. Elsevier, Saint-Louis. 
Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review 76, 323–329. 
Jensen, M.C., Ruback, R.S., 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. 
Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5–50. 
Lewellen, W., Loderer, C., Rosenfeld, A., 1985. Merger decisions and executive stock 
ownership in acquiring firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 209–231. 
Li, K., Prabhala, N.R., 2007. Self-selection models in corporate finance. In: Eckbo, B.E. 
(Ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance, Empirical Corporate Finance. Elsevier, North-
Holland Vol. 1, pp. 37–83. 
Malatesta, P.H., Thompson, R., 1985. Partially anticipated events: A model of stock price 
reactions with an application to corporate acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 
14, 237–250. 
Manne, H.G., 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political 
Economy 73, 110–120. 
Masulis, R.W., Wang, C., Xie, F., 2007. Corporate governance and acquirer returns. Journal 
of Finance 62, 1851–1888. 
Matthews, S.A., 1995. A technical primer on auction theory I: Independent private values. 
CMSEMS Discussion Paper No. 1096, Northwestern University. 
Milgrom, P.R., 2004. Putting Auction Theory to Work (Cambridge University Press). 
Mitchell, M.L., Lehn, K., 1990. Do bad bidders become good targets? Journal of Political 
Economy 98, 372–398. 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M., 2004. Firm size and the gains from 
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201–228. 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M., 2007. How do diversity of opinion and 
information asymmetry affect acquirer returns? Review of Financial Studies 20, 2047–
2078.  
Murphy, K.M., Topel, R.H. 1985. Estimation and inference in two-step econometric models. 
Journal of Business and Economic Stastistics 3, 370–379. 
Myerson, R.B., 1981. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operation Research 6, 58–73. 
  
54
Rhodes-Kropf, M., Viswanathan, S., 2004. Market valuation and merger waves. Journal of 
Finance 59, 2685–2718. 
Riley, J.G., Samuelson, W.F., 1981. Optimal auctions. American Economic Review 71, 381–
392.  
Roll, R., 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business 59, 197–
216. 
Samuelson, W.F., 1984. Bargaining under asymmetric information. Econometrica 52, 995–
1006. 
Schwert, W.G., 1996. Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial 
Economics 41, 153–192. 
Schwert, W.G., 2000. Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder? Journal of Finance 
55, 2599–2640. 
Servaes, H., 1991. Tobin’s Q and the gains from takeovers. Journal of Finance 46, 409–419. 
Song, M.H., Walkling, R.A., 2000. Abnormal returns to rivals of acquisition targets: A test of 
the ‘acquisition probability hypothesis’. Journal of Financial Economics 55, 143–171. 
Travlos, N.G., 1987. Corporate takeover bids, method of payment, and bidding firms’ stock 
returns. Journal of Finance 42, 943–963. 
Vickrey, W., 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of 
Finance 16, 8–37. 
 
  
55
Table 1 
The outcomes of the second-stage takeover battle 
 
This table presents the possible outcomes of the second-stage takeover battle.  Under the assumptions 
introduced in Section 2, three outcomes are possible: the rival highest valuation is below the initial 
acquirer’s bid (Case 1); or between the initial acquirer’s bid and the initial acquirer’s valuation (Case 
2); or above the initial acquirer’s valuation (Case 3).  For each case, the outcome price p2, the target 
shareholders profit Π2Target, and the probability of occurrence φi are reported. 
 
 
Case 1 
Rival highest valuation 
below initial acquirer bid 
 
v(1) ≤ b1 
Case 2 
Rival highest valuation 
between initial acquirer bid 
and initial acquirer valuation 
 
b1 < v(1) ≤ v1 
Case 3 
Rival highest valuation 
above initial acquirer 
valuation 
 
v(1) > v1 
Price  p2 = b1 
 
p2 = )1(
~v
 
 
p2 = v1 
Target profit 
 
Π2
Target
 = b1 – vT – c 
 
 
Π2
Target
 = )1(
~v – vT – c 
 
Π2
Target
 = “v1 – vT – c 
Initial  acquirer’s 
profit 
 
Π2
Acquirer
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Acquirer
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= 0 
Probability 
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Table 2 
Sample distributions by announcement year 
 
N and % denote, respectively, the number of acquisitions and the percentage of the sample in each 
year. The SDC sample includes 2,677 acquisitions on SDC that conform to the selection criteria 
described in Section 3.1. SEC Filings is the sub-sample of transactions with selling procedures 
identifiable from SEC filings. Auction includes transactions with multiple bidders. Negotiation 
includes deals with a single buyer.   
  
 SDC SEC Filings Auction Negotiation 
Year N % N % N % N % 
1994 115 4.30 13 2.20 9 2.95 4 1.40 
1995 225 8.40 43 7.28 23 7.54 20 6.99 
1996 236 8.82 47 7.95 24 7.87 23 8.04 
1997 340 12.70 57 9.64 30 9.84 27 9.44 
1998 335 12.51 87 14.72 35 11.48 52 18.18 
1999 322 12.03 69 11.68 30 9.84 39 13.64 
2000 275 10.27 57 9.64 31 10.16 26 9.09 
2001 192 7.17 31 5.25 16 5.25 15 5.24 
2002 103 3.85 20 3.38 11 3.61 9 3.15 
2003 141 5.27 39 6.60 22 7.21 17 5.94 
2004 147 5.49 45 7.61 23 7.54 22 7.69 
2005 129 4.82 41 6.94 27 8.85 14 4.90 
2006 117 4.37 42 7.11 24 7.87 18 6.29 
Total 2,677 100.00 591 100.00 305 100.00 286 100.00 
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Table 3  
Descriptions of samples 
  
The SDC sample includes 2,677 acquisitions on SDC that conform to the selection criteria described in Section 3.1. SEC Filings is the sub-sample of 
transactions with selling procedures identifiable from SEC filings.  Negotiation includes deals with a single buyer. N denotes the sample size. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix D. For dummy variables only the mean is reported, which gives the proportion of deals. The final column displays the p-value 
from a test that the means of the Auction and Negotiation samples are equal. Not available (N/A) entries for the SDC sample are due to missing values.   
 
Variable SDC (N=2,677) SEC Filings (N=591) Auction (N=305) Negotiation (N=286) p-value 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  
Panel A. Firm Size 
Target Size ($ billions) 1.18 0.17 1.96 0.41 1.07 0.30 2.91 0.55 0.00 
Acquirer Size ($ billions) 7.84 1.44 14.09 4.97 11.31 4.32 17.06 6.49 0.01 
Relative Size 59% 15% 20% 8% 18% 7% 23% 11% 0.05 
Panel B. Deal Characteristics 
Cash  20.32%  22.33%  28.85%  15.38%  0.00 
Toehold  2.69%  1.86%  1.64%  2.10%   0.68 
Target-initiated  N/A  42.31%  60.66%  22.73%  0.00 
Panel C. Target Characteristics 
Tobin’s q Ratio N/A N/A 1.91 1.40 1.85 1.37 1.97 1.41 0.33 
Run-up N/A N/A 4.75% 3.73% 4.84% 3.25% 4.66% 3.97% 0.90 
Intangibles N/A N/A 9.73% 1.43% 9.25% 1.30% 10.23% 1.67% 0.44 
Sales Concentration N/A N/A 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.50 
Debt Ratio 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.95 
R&D Intensive Industry  12.89%  28.60%  28.85%  28.32%  0.89 
Regulated Industry  25.33%  31.13%  32.46%  29.72%  0.47 
Strong Antitakeover State 15.52%  18.44%  18.03%  18.88%   0.79 
Panel D. Acquirer Characteristics 
Idiosyncratic Risk N/A N/A 0.021 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.021 0.019 0.29 
Acquirer to Target q Ratio N/A N/A 1.23 1.05 1.20 1.05 1.27 1.05 0.29 
GIM Index N/A N/A 9.48 9.00 9.64 10.00 9.30 9.00 0.11 
St.Dev. of EPS Forecasts N/A N/A 3.34 2.44 3.23 2.31 3.46 2.52 0.39 
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Table 4 
Bid premium and ex-ante competition proxies: Summary statistics 
 
The SDC sample includes 2,677 acquisitions on SDC that conform to the selection criteria described in Section 3.1. SEC Filings is the sub-sample of 
transactions with selling procedures identifiable from SEC filings. Auction includes transactions with multiple bidders. Negotiation includes deals with a 
single buyer. N denotes the sample size. Variable definitions are in Appendix D. The final column displays the p-value of a test that the means of the Auction 
and Negotiation samples are equal. 
 
Variable SDC (N=2,677) SEC Filings (N=591) Auction (N=305) Negotiation (N=286) p-value 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  
Bid premium 43.12% 34.37% 44.43% 34.45% 45.93% 36.39% 42.83% 32.62% 0.33 
Ex ante Competition Proxies          
Wave  32.51%  37.56%  38.03%  37.06%  0.81 
Predicted Wave 22.70% 21.61% 22.09% 21.16% 21.85% 20.90% 22.33% 21.57% 0.44 
Deal Frequency Previous Quarter 4.65% 4.21% 4.81% 4.31% 4.76% 4.15% 4.85% 4.42% 0.71 
Deal Frequency Previous Semester 8.81% 8.07% 9.01% 8.13% 8.98% 8.13% 9.04% 8.14% 0.85 
Buyout Activities 0.21% 0.17% 0.20% 0.17% 0.19% 0.16% 0.21% 0.17% 0.08 
NBER Recession  5.60%  4.91%  4.59%  5.24%  0.71 
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Table 5 
Predicted merger waves 
 
A logit model is estimated in order to predict merger waves within the 49 Fama-French industries over 
the period 1992-2007. The sample size (N) is 8,820, which is the number of months in the sample 
times the number of industries. The dependent variable is equal to one if the industry-month is 
identified as being in a merger wave using Harford’s (2005) algorithm. Industry merger waves are 
determined using a sample of 7,510 completed deals, extracted from the SDC database, which involve 
U.S. targets and with deal sizes over $50 million. The explanatory variables of the logit are measured 
at the year-end prior to the acquisition announcement.  Variable definitions are in Appendix D. The 
goodness of fit is measured by the likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic with its corresponding p-value. % 
Correct Prediction denotes the percentage of industry-months correctly classified as being in or out of 
a wave. 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 2.02 0.00 
Market-to-Book 0.04 0.02 
3-year return 0.62 0.00 
σ(3-year return) 0.17 0.00 
C&I Loan Rate Spread -6.19 0.65 
Economic Shock Index 1.42 0.00 
Economic Shock Index * Tight Capital -1.03 0.01 
   
LR Statistic 322.10 0.00 
% Correct Prediction 79.34%  
N 8,820  
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Table 6 
Correlations 
 
Panel A reports correlations among ex-ante competition proxies. Panel B present correlations among 
the target’s Tobin’s q, Market to Book ratio, Return on Assets and Debt ratio.  Variable definitions are 
in Appendix D. Statistical significance of the correlation coefficient is assessed by a classical student 
test.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The 
significance of the correlation between Deal Frequency Previous Quarter and Deal Frequency 
Previous Semester is not reported because the two variables overlap by one quarter. 
 
Panel A. Correlations among Ex-ante Competition Proxies 
 
Wave  Predicted Wave 
Deal 
Frequency 
Previous 
Quarter 
Deal 
Frequency 
Previous 
Semester 
Buyout 
Activities 
NBER 
Recession  
Wave  1.00      
Predicted Wave 0.27*** 1.00     
Deal Frequency 
Previous Quarter 0.34*** 0.12** 1.00    
Deal Frequency 
Previous Semester 0.39*** 0.26*** 0.71 1.00   
Buyout Activities 0.02 0.36*** 0.06 0.12* 1.00  
NBER Recession  -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.11* -0.02 -0.09 1.00 
 
Panel B. Correlations between Target Debt Ratio and Financial Health Indicators 
 
Tobin’s q Market to Book 
Return on 
Assets Debt Ratio 
Tobin’s q 1.00    
Market to Book 0.19*** 1.00   
Return on Assets 0.12** 0.09* 1.00  
Debt Ratio -0.07 0.19*** 0.15*** 1.00 
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Table 7 
Probability of negotiation 
 
A probit model is fit to the 591 deals with identifiable selling procedures (negotiations or auctions) 
from SEC filings. The dependent variable is a dummy that indicates a negotiated deal. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix D. The probit’s goodness of fit is measured by the likelihood-ratio (LR) 
statistic and its corresponding p-value. % Correct Prediction denotes the percentage of transactions 
correctly classified as a negotiation or an auction. 
 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.05 0.96 
Target Tobin's q ratio -0.01 0.81 
Target Intangibles 0.40 0.29 
Target Sales Concentration 0.03 0.88 
Relative Deal Size 0.08 0.59 
Acquirer Size 0.03 0.52 
Stock 0.45 0.00 
Target-Initiated -1.01 0.00 
Industry Count -0.10 0.10 
R&D intensive industry 0.03 0.85 
Strong Antitakeover State -0.04 0.79 
   
LR Statistic 112.4 0.00 
% Correct Prediction 68.18%  
N 591  
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 Table 8  
Multivariate analyses 
 
The dependent variable is the Bid Premium in all specifications. Only the proxy for ex ante competition changes from one specification to another.  Deal Freq. 
Q-1 and Deal Freq. S-1 correspond to Deal Frequency Previous Quarter and Previous Semester, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix D. All 
specifications are estimated by ordinary least squares. Heckman’s Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio, obtained using the two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure 
described in Section 3.4. The first-stage estimation of the probability of negotiation is reported in Table 7.  Standard-errors are adjusted in the second stage as 
described in Section 3.4. p-values reported in column (2) are adjusted to account for Predicted Wave being a generated regressor (see Section 3.4 for a 
description of the adjustment procedure). R² and F-Statistic denote the r-square and the Fisher statistic for the regression, respectively. N is the number of 
observations.   
 
Negotiation Sample (N=286) 
Variable (1) Wave 
(2) 
Predicted Wave 
(3) 
Deal Freq. Q-1 
(4) 
Deal Freq. S-1 
(5) 
Buyout Activities 
(6) 
NBER Recession 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Ex ante Competition Proxy 0.08 0.09 0.42 0.15 1.36 0.05 1.11 0.02 52.75 0.00 -0.15 0.10 
Target Debt Ratio -0.17 0.04 -0.15 0.08 -0.15 0.06 -0.14 0.08 -0.14 0.08 -0.15 0.06 
Control Variables             
Cash 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.34 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.23 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.34 
Toehold 0.17 0.89 0.26 0.83 0.26 0.83 0.28 0.82 0.07 0.95 0.25 0.84 
Target Run-up 0.20 0.09 0.21 0.08 0.19 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.07 0.20 0.09 
Target Size -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 
Target Tobin's q Ratio 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Risk 7.82 0.00 8.38 0.00 8.05 0.00 7.76 0.00 8.22 0.00 9.21 0.00 
Acquirer to Target q Ratio  -2E-2 0.95 -4E-4 0.99 3E-3 0.90 0.01 0.86 -3E-3 0.90 -2E-3 0.93 
Acquirer GIM Index -0.01 0.54 -0.01 0.58 -0.01 0.45 -0.01 0.46 -0.01 0.39 -0.01 0.55 
St.Dev. of Acquirer EPS Forecasts -1E-4 0.98 -1E-3 0.83 -2E-3 0.80 -2E-3 0.76 -1E-3 0.91 -2E-3 0.81 
Heckman’s Lambda -0.1 0.19 -0.10 0.20 -0.09 0.23 -0.09 0.20 -0.10 0.18 -0.09 0.21 
Adjusted-R² 24.1%  23.9%  24.3%  24.7%  25.9%  24.0%  
F-Statistic 7.22 0.00 7.14 0.00 7.31 0.00 7.45 0.00 7.94 0.00 7.19 0.00 
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Table 9 
 Multivariate analyses with additional control variables 
  
The dependent variable is the Bid Premium in all specifications. Only the proxy for ex ante competition changes from one specification to another. Deal Freq. 
Q-1 and Deal Freq. S-1 correspond to Deal Frequency Previous Quarter and Previous Semester, respectively.  Compared to Table 8, additional control 
variables are included: Dormant Period, Acquirer Free Cash Flow, Management Ownership, Hubris-Infected CEO and Average Industry Deal CARt-1.  
Variable definitions are in Appendix D. The econometric methods for the different specifications are the same as in Table 8.  R² and F-Statistic denote the r-
square and the Fisher statistic of the regression, respectively. N is the number of observations.   
 
Negotiation Sample (N=129) 
Variable (1) Wave 
(2) 
Predicted Wave 
(3) 
Deal Freq. Q-1 
(4) 
Deal Freq. S-1 
(5) 
Buyout Activities 
(6) 
NBER Recession 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Ex ante Competition Proxy 0.17 0.02 0.94 0.02 3.65 0.00 2.15 0.00 60.80 0.01 -0.08 0.64 
Target Debt Ratio -0.26 0.05 -0.20 0.13 -0.23 0.08 -0.21 0.10 -0.17 0.19 -0.18 0.18 
Control Variables 
            
Cash -0.02 0.82 -0.03 0.78 0.01 0.93 -0.01 0.93 0.06 0.50 0.01 0.88 
Toehold 1.25 0.48 2.21 0.21 1.79 0.30 1.80 0.30 2.00 0.25 1.85 0.30 
Target Run-up 0.45 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.40 0.02 0.46 0.01 0.47 0.01 
Target Size -0.10 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.00 
Target Tobin’s q Ratio 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.59 0.02 0.36 0.02 0.38 0.01 0.58 0.01 0.61 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Risk 5.98 0.13 8.34 0.03 6.58 0.08 5.35 0.17 8.81 0.02 8.69 0.03 
Acquirer to Target q Ratio  -0.04 0.26 -0.02 0.53 -0.02 0.58 -0.02 0.61 -0.02 0.52 -0.03 0.40 
Acquirer GIM Index 2E-3 0.89 0.01 0.55 4E-3 0.73 2E-3 0.88 4E-3 0.72 0.01 0.64 
St.Dev. of Acquirer EPS Forecasts -5E-3 0.56 -0.01 0.48 -0.01 0.43 -0.01 0.41 -4E-3 0.63 -0.01 0.47 
Dormant Period -6E-5 0.55 -6E-5 0.55 -3E-5 0.81 -3E-5 0.80 -1E-4 0.32 -8E-5 0.47 
Acquirer Free Cash Flow -0.26 0.59 -0.33 0.49 -0.33 0.49 -0.20 0.67 -0.34 0.48 -0.29 0.55 
Insider Ownership -5.67 0.06 -4.06 0.17 -4.13 0.16 -3.82 0.19 -2.58 0.39 -3.74 0.21 
Hubris-infected CEO 0.03 0.76 0.07 0.46 0.08 0.39 0.09 0.33 0.04 0.66 0.09 0.35 
Average Industry Deal CARt-1 -0.67 0.21 -0.56 0.29 -0.77 0.15 -0.77 0.15 -0.75 0.16 -0.70 0.20 
Heckman’s Lambda -0.19 0.13 -0.16 0.21 -0.20 0.11 -0.21 0.09 -0.20 0.12 -0.17 0.17 
Adjusted-R² 34.5%  34.4%  36.0%  35.9%  34.6%  31.6%  
F-Statistic 3.44 0.00 3.43 0.00 3.67 0.00 3.66 0.00 3.46 0.00 3.02 0.00 
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Table 10 
Bootstrap p-values with the predicted wave proxy, a generated regressor 
 
This table compares Murphy and Topel (1985) adjusted p-values (see Section 3.4) to percentile-t 
bootstrap p-values when the Predicted Wave is the proxy for ex-ante competition.   Predicted Wave is 
a generated regressor from a first-stage logit model (see Section 3.3 and Table 5). Variable definitions 
are in Appendix D. Coef. and p-value are from Table 8 column (2) and are reproduced here to ease 
comparison; p-value* is the corresponding bootstrap values 1,000 generated samples. 
 
 
Variable Negotiation Sample (N=286) 
 Coef. p-value p-value* 
Predicted Wave 0.42 0.15 0.10 
Target Debt ratio -0.15 0.08 0.01 
Control Variables    
Cash 0.06 0.34 0.23 
Toehold 0.26 0.83 0.69 
Target Run-up 0.21 0.08 0.10 
Target Size -0.06 0.00 0.00 
Target Tobin's q Ratio 0.04 0.01 0.02 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Risk 8.38 0.00 0.00 
Acquirer to Target q Ratio  -4E-4 0.99 0.96 
Acquirer GIM Index -0.01 0.58 0.32 
St.Dev. of Acquirer EPS Forecasts -1E-3 0.83 0.63 
Heckman’s Lambda -0.10 0.20 0.18 
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 Table 11 
 Ex ante competition proxies and gains from the trade 
  
The dependent variable is the Deal CAR in all specifications. The Deal CAR is the value-weighted sum of the acquirer and the target CARs. The acquirer and 
the target CARs are obtained using the market model return generating process. The market model coefficients are estimated over a window from day -200 to 
day -30 with respect to the announcement date. The event window goes from day -5 to day +5 with respect to the announcement date. The market values of 
the acquirer and the target are obtained using market prices 30 days before the announcement date. Only the proxy for ex ante competition changes from one 
specification to another. Deal Freq. Q-1 and Deal Freq. S-1 correspond to Deal Frequency Previous Quarter and Previous Semester, respectively. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix D. All specifications are estimated by ordinary least squares. Heckman’s Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio, obtained using the 
two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure described in Section 3.4. The first-stage estimation of the probability of negotiation is reported in Table 7.  Standard-
errors are adjusted in the second stage as described in Section 3.4. p-values reported in column (2) are adjusted to account for Predicted Wave being a 
generated regressor (see Section 3.4 for a description of the adjustment procedure). R² and F-Statistic denote the r-square and the Fisher statistic for the 
regression, respectively. The number of observations is 286 in all specifications.   
 
Variable (1) Wave 
(2) 
Predicted Wave 
(3) 
Deal Freq. Q-1 
(4) 
Deal Freq. S-1 
(5) 
Buyout Activities 
(6) 
NBER Recession 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Ex ante Competition Proxy -0.01 0.46 -0.02 0.74 -0.003 0.99 -0.09 0.43 2.422 0.54 -0.031 0.17 
Target Debt Ratio 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.44 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.45 0.016 0.40 0.016 0.40 
Control Variables             
Cash 0.028 0.05 0.028 0.05 0.028 0.05 0.027 0.06 0.029 0.04 0.026 0.07 
Toehold -0.018 0.95 -0.020 0.95 -0.012 0.97 -0.026 0.93 -0.012 0.97 0.018 0.95 
Target Run-up -0.002 0.96 -0.003 0.92 -0.003 0.91 0.000 0.99 -0.004 0.90 -0.007 0.80 
Target Size 0.003 0.41 0.002 0.48 0.002 0.51 0.003 0.40 0.002 0.47 0.002 0.53 
Target Tobin's q Ratio -0.009 0.01 -0.009 0.01 -0.009 0.01 -0.010 0.01 -0.009 0.01 -0.010 0.00 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Risk 0.852 0.12 0.803 0.14 0.812 0.14 0.850 0.12 0.811 0.14 1.003 0.07 
Acquirer to Target q Ratio  -0.003 0.67 -0.003 0.65 -0.003 0.64 -0.003 0.60 -0.003 0.62 -0.003 0.59 
Acquirer GIM Index 0.001 0.64 0.001 0.65 0.001 0.65 0.001 0.61 0.001 0.68 0.001 0.65 
St.Dev. of Acquirer EPS Forecasts -0.001 0.55 -0.001 0.61 -0.001 0.60 -0.001 0.63 -0.001 0.61 -0.001 0.56 
Heckman’s Lambda 0.014 0.42 0.013 0.43 0.013 0.44 0.013 0.43 0.013 0.45 0.013 0.44 
Adjusted-R² 4.6%  4.5%  4.4%  4.7%  4.6%  5.1%  
F-Statistic 1.11  1.07  1.06  1.11  1.09  1.22  
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Table 12 
The bid premium analysis – SEC Filings sample 
 
The SEC Filings sample includes auctions (multiple bidders) and negotiations (single bidder.) The dependent variable is the Bid Premium in all specifications.  
Only the proxy for ex ante competition changes from one specification to another. Deal Freq. Q-1 and Deal Freq. S-1 correspond to Deal Frequency Previous 
Quarter and Previous Semester, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix D. All specifications are estimated by ordinary least squares.  Heckman’s 
Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio, obtained using the two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure described in Section 3.4. The first-stage estimation of the 
probability of negotiation is reported in Table 7. Standard-errors are adjusted in the second stage as described in Section 3.4.  p-values reported in column (2) 
are adjusted to account for Predicted Wave being a generated regressor (see Section 3.4 for a description of the adjustment procedure).  R² and F-Statistic 
denote the r-square and the Fisher statistic for the regression, respectively.  N is the number of observations.   
 
SEC Filings Sample (N=591) 
Variable (1) Wave 
(2) 
Predicted Wave 
(3) 
Deal Freq. Q-1 
(4) 
Deal Freq. S-1 
(5) 
Buyout Activities 
(6) 
NBER Recession 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Ex ante competition proxy 0.03 0.30 0.36 0.06 0.54 0.30 0.56 0.11 40.99 0.00 -0.09 0.16 
Target Debt Ratio 0.06 0.33 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 -0.07 0.24 0.06 0.27 
Control Variables 
            
Cash 0.04 0.25 0.05 0.17 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.24 
Toehold 3.57 0.00 3.53 0.00 3.54 0.00 3.56 0.00 3.38 0.00 3.55 0.00 
Target Run-up 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Target Size -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 
Target Tobin's q Ratio 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Risk 6.03 0.00 6.55 0.00 6.12 0.00 5.95 0.00 6.03 0.00 6.65 0.00 
Acquirer to Target q Ratio  -4E-3 0.83 -0.01 0.79 -2E-3 0.91 5E-4 0.98 -0.01 0.81 -0.01 0.80 
Acquirer GIM Index -1E-3 0.83 -2E-3 0.78 -2E-3 0.73 -2E-3 0.73 -3E-3 0.64 -1E-3 0.81 
St.Dev. of Acquirer growth -1E-3 0.75 -2E-3 0.62 -2E-3 0.65 -2E-3 0.64 -1E-3 0.76 -2E-3 0.65 
Adjusted-R² 21.1%  21.4%  21.1%  21.3%  22.4%  21.2%  
F-Statistic 13.86 0.00 14.14 0.00 13.86 0.00 14.03 0.00 14.99 0.00 13.96 0.00 
 
 
